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ABSTRACT  
This paper discusses the relation between law and contingency in the formation of value. It begins 
from a much-ignored assertion of Marx, repeated throughout his works, that the equality of supply 
and demand is contingent and their non-equality constitutes their law. This highly complex and 
original idea leads us to the idea of capitalism, and a market, as an entity which perpetuates itself by 
failing to perpetuate itself: it is the fact that supply diverges from demand which causes the system to 
continue, not the fact that supply equals demand, which is only the case as a statistical average and 
never exactly holds. 
This fundamental and unrecognised difference between Marx’s approach and that of the classicals 
also distinguishes Marx from most modern economics, which has focussed on equilibrium as the de 
facto defining principle from which value may be deduced. The problem is exactly the opposite: it is 
to define a conception of value which does not require equilibrium and makes no presupposition that 
supply equals demand, that goods are sold, that profits equalise, or that any of the ‘lawlike’ 
properties of an ideal market actually hold. 
The ‘lawlike’ properties of a market must then be deduced as an outcome of the dynamic, that is 
temporal, behaviour of the market, expressed in terms of the interaction between value so defined 
and use value. In order that such a concept of value may have universal applicability, price has to be 
reformulated as a form of value, and money theorised on this foundation. This article, presented to 
the EEA mini-conference on value at the Eastern Economic Association, March 1999, sets out the 
general principles involved. 
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The vulgar economists have practically no inkling of the nature of value; hence, 
whenever they wish to consider the phenomenon in its purity, after their fashion, they 
assume that supply and demand are equal. 
– Marx, Capital Volume I, p260 
In order to find out how the simple expression of the value of a commodity lies hidden in the value-
relation between two commodities, we must, first of all, consider the value-relation quite 
independently of its quantitative aspect. The usual procedure is the precise opposite of this: nothing 
is seen in the value-relation but the proportion in which definite quantities of two sorts of commodity 
count as equal to each other. It is overlooked that the magnitudes of different things only become 
comparable in quantitative terms when they have been reduced to the same unit. 
– Marx, op cit, p141 
INTRODUCTION: MARX AND THE RICARDIAN LAW OF VALUE 
In his earliest work on political economy, in a formulation repeated and expanded throughout his life, 
Marx (1975:260) offers a root-and-branch critique of the Ricardian concept of ‘economic law’:
2 
Both on the question of relations of money to the value of metal and in his demonstration that the 
cost of production is the sole factor in the determination of value Mill succumbs to the error, made 
by the whole Ricardo school, of defining an abstract law without mentioning the fluctuations or 
the continual suspension through which it comes into being. 
If e.g. it is an invariable law that in the last analysis – or rather in the sporadic (accidental) 
coincidence of supply and demand – the cost of production determines price (value), then it is no 
less an invariable law that these relations do not obtain, i.e. that value and the cost of production 
do not stand in any necessary relation.  
Indeed, supply and demand only ever coincide momentarily thanks to a previous fluctuation in 
supply and demand, to the disparity between the cost of production and the exchange value. This 
is the real movement, then, and the above-mentioned law is no more than an abstract, contingent 
as one-sided moment in it.
3 
This counterposes two radically different treatments of the same issue: since value does not appear 
openly but in the form of price, and since value is unaffected by supply and demand whereas price 
itself fluctuates with their movement, what possible relation can there be between value and price? 
The Ricardian answer, from which Marx demarcated himself for the rest of his life, is to enquire in 
what ratio goods must exchange in order to equalise demand to supply. Value then reduces to a 
special kind of price. Marx’s answer, the polar opposite, is to ask what relations make exchange 
possible, regardless of supply and demand. Price is then explained as a form of appearance of value. 
The two conceptions stand opposed as the imaginary to the real. The Ricardian abstract law, 
supposing a relation that never happens, imposes ideal prices and values on reality. Marx’s ‘no less 
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2 I am indebted to Julian Wells for drawing my attention to this excerpt. 
3 The emphasis on the first two sentences in the third paragraph is mine. According to the translators, in the second paragraph the bracketed words are 
written above the word that precedes them, that is the word ‘accidental’ is written above the word ‘sporadic’ and the word ‘value’ is written above the 
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invariable law’, insisting on a motion which always happens, imposes real prices and values on the 
imagination. 
Economic theory bifurcates with this critique. The purpose of this paper is to explain how. 
Outline of aims 
In the long postwar dispute on value, all sides accept that at least two different determinations of the 
magnitude of value and/or price are under discussion: on the one hand in terms of labour-time in 
some sense, on the other hand in terms of size, ‘physical quantity’ or use-value.
4 
This paper argues that the determination of the magnitude of either value or price in terms of use-
value is both qualitatively and quantitatively incompatible with their determination in terms of 
labour-time. It traces the logical origin of the use-value concept of value –  ‘wealth’ as opposed to 
‘riches’ – to the Achilles heel of the Ricardian approach and the target of Marx’s critique, namely the 
presupposition that supply equals demand.  
This approach has evolved into a paradigm – the equilibrium, comparative static or simultaneous 
approach
5 – which dominates the whole of economics including post-Sraffian
6 and most Marxist 
writing. I will show it renders all such theory incompatible with Marx’s own theory. No 
reconciliation is possible between Marx’s values or prices of production on the one hand, and on the 
other classical ‘natural price’, neoclassical long-run prices, or Sraffian prices. The two concepts are 
both qualitatively and quantitatively different. 
Marx’s critique of the Ricardian school led him to an alternative theory of value. The core of this 
theory is his law of value, which not only embraces his radical alternative to equilibrium but rejects 
Ricardo’s purely quantitative value concept. For Marx, a quantitative law applies to objects with a 
qualitatively identical substance or essence. All prices and all values must be reduced to abstract 
labour, before any law governing their relation can be asserted or investigated. This is impossible in 
an equilibrium framework, and indispensable in a non-equilibrium framework. 
I will show that Marx’s difference with Ricardo goes beyond this qualitative distinction once the 
economy departs from stasis, that is, in any real economy. Any equilibrium approach then 
necessarily determines both price and value in the neoclassical manner, by quantity of use-value, and 
not in Marx’s manner, by quantity of labour time. 
This is because neither equilibrium values, nor equilibrium prices, can actually function as prices: 
they cannot serve as the basis of any actual exchange. Claims that such ‘prices’ are concrete or 
empirically-accessible are false: equilibrium prices are a concealed value-concept, attempting to 
explain what is observed in terms of something not directly observed. However unlike Marx’s non-
equilibrium values, whose point of departure is an actual market which exists through its motion, 
equilibrium prices presuppose an ideal market which cannot exist because has no motion. Whereas 
Marx’s values do exist and do underlie what is observed, equilibrium prices do not exist and cannot 
underlie what is observed. 
                                                 
4 The surplus approach, in speaking of ‘physical quantities’, does not abolish this divide but disguises it, in the last analysis incoherently, by proceeding 
as if use-value may be split into two parts, subjective satisfaction and physical measure. In fact, one cannot separate use from being: one may neither 
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This defines their ideological function, since market failure cannot be derived from a theory which 
assumes a priori that the market works. But it also renders them incapable of performing a scientific 
function, that is, representing reality. 
The ‘transformation problem’ does not cease to exist. The relation between such prices and actual 
market prices must still be explained and measured. It is wished away by a dogmatic assumption, 
asserted without proof, that equilibrium prices approximate the behaviour of real prices. I will show 
this is necessarily false because no real prices could be approximated in this way. If, abandoning this 
dogma, we transform comparative static prices so that goods can exchange at these ratios, the amount 
of money for which they exchange is determined not by the labour expended in producing them, but 
by the magnitude of their use-value, directly contrary to Marx’s value-concept. 
This problem simply does not arise with either Marx’s values or Marx’s prices of production which, 
when determined without assuming equilibrium, are perfectly capable of functioning as the basis of 
exchange and do not violate the determination of value by the magnitude of labour time. 
Four appendices support the paper. The first explains our approach to theory, distinguishing 
interpretation from two forms of dogmatism: hermeneutics, or deriving truth from texts, and 
solipsism, or imposing the reader’s meaning on the author’s text. The second appendix provides 
textual evidence that Marx’s critique of Ricardo became the centre of his developed value theory. 
The third provides evidence of the correspondence between this theory and the temporal single-
system interpretation of his value-concept.
7 The fourth establishes the logical identity between four 
equivalent concepts in economics: the Ricardian presupposition that supply equals demand (Say’s 
Law); equilibrium, stasis or proportionate growth; comparative statics, the modern form of 
equilibrium; and the simultaneous or algebraic determination of value and price as fixed points of a 
self-reproducing system. 
QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN MARX’S CRITIQUE OF RICARDO 
Our opening citation is completely unambiguous: in it Marx draws a line in the sand between himself 
and ‘the whole Ricardo school’. Appendix II shows that he maintained this critique throughout his 
work. Any notion that he was a special kind of Ricardian, or merely a development of Ricardo, 
should therefore be regarded with the utmost suspicion: At the very least, he did not see himself that 
way. 
But this critique was not the only such divide. Marx’s mature work is a systematic critique of 
Ricardo’s exclusive concentration on the quantitative aspect of value at the expense of the 
qualitative: 
Ricardo’s mistake is that he is concerned only with the magnitude of value. Consequently his 
attention is concentrated on the relative quantities of labour which the different commodities 
represent, or which the commodities as values embody. But the labour embodied in them must be 
represented as social labour, as alienated individual labour. In the price this representation is 
nominal; it becomes reality only in the sale. This transformation of the labour of private 
individuals contained in the commodities into uniform social labour, consequently into labour 
which can be expressed in all use-values and can be exchanged for them, this qualitative aspect of 
the matter which is contained in the representation of exchange-value as money, is not elaborated 
by Ricardo. This circumstance – the necessity of presenting the labour contained in commodities 
as uniform social labour, i.e. as money – is overlooked by Ricardo. (Marx 1972: 131) 
A key formulation in Capital Volume I connects these two critiques: 
In order to find out how the simple expression of the value of a commodity lies hidden in the 
value-relation between two commodities, we must, first of all, consider the value-relation quite 
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independently of its quantitative aspect. The usual procedure is the precise opposite of this: 
nothing is seen in the value-relation but the proportion in which definite quantities of two sorts of 
commodity count as equal to each other. It is overlooked that the magnitudes of different things 
only become comparable in quantitative terms when they have been reduced to the same unit. 
Only as expressions of the same unit do they have a common denominator, and are therefore 
commensurable magnitudes.(Marx 1979:141) 
Marx’s concern to reduce incommensurate magnitudes to a common denominator is often portrayed 
as metaphysical. And indeed, if supply did equal demand, the qualitative aspect could be safely 
ignored. When the scales balance, does it matter why? The measurement itself connects the 
measured objects: what they have in common is ‘being weighed’. We can build scales without a 
concept of mass, which is why they existed long before Newton. 
The problem is what happens when they don’t balance. With any piece of machinery; you only really 
need the manual when it breaks. Awkward questions then arise like: how fast does it move? What 
force does the imbalance exert? What impact does the motion have on the requirements of balance in 
any case? We then have to connect its components to the rest of nature. Only when Galileo, Newton 
and their followers asked such ‘metaphysical’ questions could physics formulate general laws of 
nature with the general concepts of mass, energy and force. 
Economics, when it worries about such matters, resorts to the metaphor of a pendulum, oscillating 
about a static position.
8 But there is a vital difference. The pendulum can survive without moving, 
but the market cannot. Because it must move to exist, its existence can only be explained by its 
movement. So rast ich, so rost ich. A tornado in stasis is no longer a tornado. Like a tornado, an 
avalanche or indeed a living being, the market exists as a self-sustaining entity only in and through 
movement;  
It is not just that markets fail: the point is that this is how they work. Only when supply differs from 
demand do the mechanisms which equate them come into play; moreover the very process of 
equalisation in one sphere disequilibriates all others, whereon eternally restless capital disrupts all 
balance as it scrambles for gains and stampedes from losses in its thirst for surplus profit, the life 
force of the market. 
There is no economic pair of scales. A market is never in a state which permits exchange at 
equilibrium prices. From the very outset we have to follow Newton and Galileo, and study its motion 
with general concepts, the equivalent of mass and energy, which can express all possible exchange 
relations in terms of unifying concepts, so that we can compare them and say things about them 
which apply to all of them. 
We need, in short, a way of talking about price which does not depend on the relation between 
supply and demand. We need to enquire qualitatively what the value of a commodity consists of, 
external to and independent of any subsequent exchange relations it enters into, before and in order 
to study the quantitative phenomenon of real market prices. 
Price is a form of value; value is not a special price 
In the course of production, capitalists bring sums of money and workers bring their labour-power, 
and between them they make things that get sold for money. In a certain sense, the entire issue of the 
value-price relation begins when we ask how this can be possible: how can we add £100 to 1000 
hours? All other issues of heterogeneity pale into insignificance beside this; it’s the big one. 
The Ricardian answer is, as we have seen, that qualitatively 1000 hours is really a sum of money. 
Value is really just a kind of price, a magnitude of a special use-value, and the only problem is to 
find out why 10 hours should contribute this amount of money instead of that amount of money. 
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Marx’s answer is the complete opposite: it is that £100 is really a sum of hours. Price is really just a 
form of value, a magnitude of abstract labour time, and the real problem is to find out how £100 gets 
to represent this amount of hours instead of that amount of hours. 
It is a great mistake to suppose that Marx confined his analysis of the value-price relation to prices of 
production, as appendix III establishes. Unlike Ricardo, unlike Sraffa, unlike Walras, unlike most 
Marxists, and unlike almost the whole of economics, Marx treated all prices as forms of appearance 
of a common substance – abstract labour time – to which they could be qualitatively and 
quantitatively reduced. The money price of any commodity, at any time, represents a definite 
magnitude of this abstract labour time, quantitatively distinct from its value. This value is given in 
production independent of circulation, the price of the commodity is given in circulation after 
production, and the value-price relation consists of the relation between these two distinct quantities. 
Value is thus a universal category which applies to all possible market prices. Price, in three words, 
is a form of value. 
This is made clear in a vital passage dealing with market price from the Grundrisse (Marx 
1974:139), given in full in appendix II: 
The price of a commodity constantly stands above or below the value of the commodity, and the 
value of the commodity itself exists only in this up-and-down movement of commodity prices. 
Supply and demand constantly determine the prices of commodities; never balance, or only 
coincidentally; but the cost of production, for its part, determines the oscillations of supply and 
demand…On the assumption that the production costs of a commodity and the production costs of 
gold and silver remain constant, the rise or fall of its market price means nothing more than that 
a commodity, = x labour time, constantly commands > or < x labour time on the market, that it 
stands above or beneath its average value as determined by labour time. [my emphasis] 
Almost everything essential is contained in this passage. Market value (price) equates with real value 
(value) ‘never by means of an equation with real value’. Price is ‘constantly’ determined by supply 
and demand, its fluctuations ‘never balance out’ and value ‘exists only’ in this up-and-down 
movement. But market value nevertheless is a form of value: its rise or fall ‘means nothing more’ 
than that the commodity commands ‘> or < x labour time on the market.’ And this relation between 
value and price – the ‘law’ – is established not instantaneously but through the movement of prices 
so that value appears ‘as the law of motions that the former runs through.’ 
Marx explicitly specifies market price as a magnitude of labour time: a commodity whose price is 
above its value commands more labour time on the market and a commodity whose price is below its 
value commands less. 
Money: the general representative of abstract labour time 
This requires a novel and still poorly-understood analysis of money. I do not intend here to enter the 
rich and complex debate about whether it is necessarily a commodity. I think it is clear from his 
writings, however, that money has two distinct use-values: the use-value of the material of which it is 
composed (whether precious metal, representative of precious metal, or token of state authority as 
legal tender) and the use-value of serving as the representative of abstract social labour, as the 
general means of purchase of commodities. 
The transformation of a commodity into money – its acquisition of a price in circulation – does not 
alter the qualitative fact that everything enters exchange as a ‘manifestation of a common substance’. 
The use-value of money is itself its capacity to represent this common substance – abstract or social 
labour – and it does so independent of its material form. Price formation is a quantitative 
modification; the money price of a commodity represents (outside the exceptional circumstances 
where supply equals demand) a different magnitude of social labour from the value of the 
commodity itself: 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  7 
[I]n the hands of the people whose commodities have been transformed into money, they exist not 
as exchange-value in the form of a particular use-value, but as use-value (gold, for example) 
which merely represents exchange-value. A commodity may be sold either below or above its 
value. This is purely a matter of the magnitude of its value. But whenever a commodity is sold, 
transformed into money, its exchange-value acquires an independent existence, separate from its 
use-value. The commodity now exists only as a certain quantity of social labour-time…an 
examination of money – of that absolute exchangeability which the commodity possesses as 
money, of its absolute effectiveness as exchange-value which has nothing to do with the 
magnitude of value – shows that it is not quantitatively, but qualitatively determined. (Marx 
1972:137) 
Whatever the value of the material of money, once it is accepted that supply and demand cannot in 
general balance, it must be that the labour-time represented by money in exchange, that is, the value 
of its distinct use-value of serving as money, cannot be equal to the labour time involved in 
producing that material. In his early writings Marx was very clear on this question (Marx 1978:84): 
[G]old and silver, as money, are of all commodities the only ones not determined by their cost of 
production; and this is so true that in circulation they can be replaced by paper. So long as there is 
a certain proportion observed between the requirements of circulation and the amount of money 
issued, be it paper, gold, platinum or copper money, there can be no question of a proportion to be 
observed between the intrinsic value (cost of production) and the nominal value of 
money…Ricardo understood this truth so well that, after basing his whole system on value 
determined by labour time.. he adds, nevertheless, that the value of money is not determined by 
the labour time its substance embodies, but by the law of supply and demand only. 
It has been argued (OPE 1141,1262) that Marx abandoned this view in later life. I think this arises 
from two sources of confusion: first, neglect of the distinction between the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the function of money, and second, conflating Marx’s quite distinct concept of 
the value of money with the quantity theory of money, which I don’t think Marx ever endorsed, and 
generally treated with scorn. 
First, the issue becomes clearer once we recognise that anything which serves as money has two 
distinct use-values. That which appears, for every other commodity, as a discrepancy between price 
and its value, appears for money as a discrepancy between the labour-time associated with these two 
use-values. When all nominal prices rise above values, what does this mean? If silver is the money 
commodity it means that the silver use-value of the same physical weight of silver now represents 
less labour-time than the money use-value of the same physical weight of silver. The value of money 
has fallen, even though the value of silver has not changed. Conversely when all nominal prices fall 
below values, it means that silver considered as money represents more labour-time than silver 
considered as a precious metal. Indeed this is the only way to attach meaning to Marx’s assertion that 
money can become a ‘depreciated token of itself’. Moreover  it offers a rational explanation for the 
empirical phenomenon of liquidity preference. In a régime of falling prices it makes perfect sense to 
acquire money because one can make a profit in value terms by doing so: the value that this money 
represents is rising over time, so that a money asset is growing in value. 
Second, in the derivation of money in Capital what matters for Marx is not the quantitative 
determination of value but the qualitative fact of possessing it at all. Since his concern is to derive 
money without supposing any special properties of money; supposing it is a commodity with a value 
in its own right is the minimum assumption to make, a point which a later generation, for whom gold 
is considered special and unusual, often loses sight of. Paper money can be treated as a special kind 
of commodity which is instrinsically worthless; but those economists who begin from money with 
special properties that set it aside from other commodities, frequently finish by attributing its 
functions to these special properties. It is then a mystery that almost any commodity can and does 
replace such special money. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  8 
Third, the rate at which money exchanges, once supply departs from demand, must be quantitatively 
different from the intrinsic value of its material. Our section 0 citation (Marx 1979:196) makes this 
clear. Since no commodity exchanges in proportion to its value, why make an exception for money? 
At the very least, therefore, there is a concept missing; when any other good exchanges at a rate other 
than its value, we may speak of its price, and of price-value difference. But money cannot have a 
price, since it is itself the form in which price appears. Nevertheless, a difference exists between the 
labour embodied intrinsically in its material, and the labour it commands on the market. This second 
magnitude is a distinct concept which, I think, is what Marx means when he speaks of the labour 
which money represents in exchange. 
Fourth, nothing in Marx mentions a quantity theory or needs to be interpreted as referring to it. What 
he says is that the value of money is determined ‘by the laws of supply and demand’. Supply and 
demand for what? Not for money, but, as he clearly states in his critique of Ricardo’s quantity 
theory, for everything else: that is, the general process of price formation of all commodities taken 
together. 
The invariance of value in circulation, or conservation of value 
The underlying conception, which I discuss at greater length in Appendix III, is in my view the 
invariance of value in circulation, or Marx’s ‘first equality’. In the vital chapter 5 of Volume I of 
Capital entitled ‘Contradictions in the General Formula’ Marx sets out to examine the proposition 
that surplus-value can arise in exchange. He assesses all possible variations in price, both relative and 
nominal, and argues that none of them can alter the magnitude of value in circulation. If £50 is the 
price of corn whose value is 60 hours, and the price of wine of value 40 is £50, then the two may 
exchange against each other so that the wine-buyer can receive 40 hours (losing 10) and the corn-
buyer may receive 60 hours (gaining 10). But the total number of hours in circulation is unchanged; 
no new value has been created or destroyed, measured in hours. In this set of exchanges, £100 
represents 100 hours because the total value of the commodities involved is 100 and their total price 
is £100. The value of the use-value money is established in the same way over all commodities 
entering circulation. 
The magnitude that matters here is not the total money in circulation but the total commodity-
capital.
9 The value of money is determined by the claim it represents on the aggregate social labour 
that is exchangeable for money. If, therefore, there are goods in circulation whose value is 1,000,000 
hours and whose price is £200,000 then each pound represents 5 hours. The monetary expression of 
labour-time, to use a phrase of Rodriguez (1996) and Ramos and Rodriguez (1996), is a relation 
between the value, and the price, of all commodities taken together, and this is why it is independent 
of the quantity of money in circulation. The same idea is implicit in the work of New Solution 
writers (cf Foley 1982, Duménil 1980), although these use the phrase ‘value of money’. 
How, then, is the value of a commodity formed in production? How can £100 be added to 1000 
hours? Because the £100 already represents a magnitude of social labour in circulation, through 
being the general representative of value in exchange. The constant capital and the living labour are 
composed the same homogeneous substance; all that remains is to establish the quantitative 
consequence by adding them up. This is so simple that it is hard to avoid wondering whether it is not 
this very simplicity that deters the career academic from accepting it. 
The central quantitative question then becomes the following: how is the MELT determined? This 
has been developed richly in recent literature. This discussion began with the ‘New Solution’ 
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approach of Foley (1982), Duménil (1980)
10 and others and continued with the approach which I 
designate ‘simultaneous single system’ (SSS): Moseley (1993) and Lee (1983), Wolff, Roberts and 
Callari(1982). Four suggestions are extant. The New Solution and Moseley define it as the ratio of 
living labour to money value added. SSS authors except Moseley implicitly define it as the ratio of 
total value of output to total money price of output, as do some TSS authors (cf Ramos and 
Rodriguez 1996). I define it as the ratio of the total value of stocks to the total money price of stocks.  
Regardless of these differences, what concerns us here is that the MELT cannot be determined 
simultaneously with the value of the commodities it refers to, because it is formed in circulation and 
these values are formed in production, independent of and prior to the MELT. 
In particular a simultaneous calculation of the MELT leads to the insoluble contradictions. If  £100 is 
spent on cotton in order to produce yarn, and if we insist that this £100 represents the same 
magnitude of value when the cotton is purchased as when the yarn is sold, then changes in the price 
of the yarn will retrospectively modify the value of the cotton after its consumption. An equilibrium 
determination of the MELT is incompatible with Marx’s theory and incoherent in its own right. The 
central question of value theory is to determine the MELT without the prior assumption of 
equilibrium. 
Finally, we should ask in passing why a ‘principle’ that values is invariant in circulation is logically 
justified. Why shouldn’t value increase in circulation? The question answers itself. By making a 
distinction at all between production and circulation, almost any economic theorist divides all social 
activity into two spheres, one in which ‘something’ is produced (production) and another in which 
this ‘something’ is distributed, partitioned between the members of society(circulation). This is 
perhaps one of the most universal distinctions in economics: I can’t think of any school of thought 
which does not try to make it. But  if extra value can arise in circulation, this distinction becomes 
absurd. It means that the activity we have called ‘circulation’ is not actually circulation but an 
admixture of circulation and production. It means, in effect, that we abandon the attempt to make the 
distinction stick at all; we more or less give up trying to make sense of a capitalist economy. 
Value is determined independent of exchange 
We can now return to the non-equilibrium determination of the value of a commodity, and 
demonstrate that it is in fact perfectly determinate. 
The first and most basic point is that, in consequence of the function of money as representative of 
social labour-time, the labour-time which capital represents in the labour-process is not given by the 
means of production contained in it, but by the money used to purchase them. These goods enter 
production via the intermediary of money. Capital is precisely abstract value, self-expanding value. 
The capitalist does not care what the money buys; is indifferent to it. The value transferred to her/his 
product by constant capital, and deducted from her/his profits by  variable capital, is transferred or 
deducted in the form of money. If the inputs rise in price, then more labour is required to acquire 
them and consequently the product rises in value – exactly as our citation in section 0 establishes. 
In Volume III this is completely explicit: 
[I]f an increase in the price of raw material takes place with a significant amount of finished 
goods already present on the market, at whatever stage of completion, then the value of these 
commodities rises and there is a corresponding increase in the value of the capital involved… 
Our whole investigation has proceeded from the assumption that any rise or fall in prices is an 
expression of real fluctuations in value. But since we are dealing here with the effect that these 
price fluctuations have on the profit rate, it is actually a matter of indifference what their basis 
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might be. The present argument is just as valid if prices rise or fall not as a result of fluctuations in 
value, but rather as a result of the intervention of the credit system, competition, etc. 
Since the rate of profit is equal to the proportionate excess in the value of the product over the 
value of the total capital advanced, an increase in the rate of profit that arose from a devaluation 
of the capital advanced would involve a loss in capital value. (1981:208) 
Thus if the price – the market price – of inputs rises or falls, in consequence a greater or lesser 
magnitude of abstract labour time is transferred to the product. The value of constant capital is given 
not by the value of the means of production as such, but by the value which is represented, on the 
market, by the money with which they are purchased. 
The value of a product is now very simple to establish. If £100 is paid for constant capital, we must 
first determine how much labour-time it represents.
11 Suppose this is 10 hours per £. The capital then 
represents 1000 hours. If then living labour of 1000 hours is expended in working up this capital, its 
value is 1000+1000 = 2000 hours. That’s all there is to it. 
What is the relation between the value of a product, so calculated, and the price for which it sells? 
The answer is: none. There is no necessary relation between the labour time embodied in a 
commodity, and the labour-time which it realises when it is sold. The necessary relations between 
price and value apply at the level of the aggregate product in the shape of the invariance of value in 
circulation. They do not apply to individual commodities. 
This is precisely because supply does not equal demand. In consequence, we cannot presume any 
‘necessary relation’ between these two when calculating value: 
although price, being the exponent of the magnitude of a commodity’s value, is is the exponent of 
its exchange-ratio with money, it does not follow that the exponent of this exchange-ratio is 
necessarily the exponent of the magnitude of the commodity’s value. Suppose two equal 
quantities of socially necessary labour are respectively represented by 1 quarter of wheat and £2 
(approximately ½ ounce of gold). £2 is the expression in money of the magnitude of the value of 
the quarter of wheat, or its price. If circumstances now allow this price to be raised to £3, or 
compel it to be reduced to £1, then although £1 and £3 may be too small or too large to give 
proper expression to the magnitude of the wheat’s value, they are nevertheless prices of the 
wheat, for they are, in the first place, the form of its value, i.e. money, and, in the second place, 
the exponents of its exchange-ratio with money. If the conditions of production, or the productivity 
of labour, remain constant, the same amount of social labour-time must be expended on the 
reproduction of a quarter of wheat, both before and after the change in price. This situation is not 
dependent either on the will of the wheat producer or on that of the owners of the other 
commodities. The magnitude of the value of a commodity therefore expresses a necessary relation 
to social labour-time which is inherent in the process by which its value is created. With the 
transformation of the magnitude of value into the price this necessary relation appears as the 
exchange-ratio between a single commodity and the money commodity which exists outside it. 
This relation, however, may express both the magnitude of value of the commodity and the 
greater or lesser quantity of money for which it can be sold under the given circumstances. The 
possibility, therefore, of a quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value, i,e, the 
possibility that the price may diverge from the magnitude of value, is inherent in the price-form 
itself. this is not a defect but, on the contrary, it makes this form the adequate one for a mode of 
production whose laws can only assert themselves as blindly operating averages between constant 
irregularities. (Marx 1979:196, my emphasis) 
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Marx vs the value-form school 
Though not the main function of this paper, we must note that this conception differs decisively from 
the approach of the ‘value-form’ school who maintain that the value of a commodity is not 
quantitatively determined prior to exchange.  
The reason that price is a form of value, for Marx, is not that value is in some sense incomplete or 
indefinite until the act of realisation, but quite the contrary, it is because value is defined prior to and 
independently of price, so that price may clearly be defined in terms of this pre-existing value. A 
commodity enters circulation with a value that is given independent of exchange, in the production 
process. This value is the sum two parts: the abstract labour time represented by the money spent on 
constant capital, and the abstract labour time imparted by the workers in production. This is given 
completely independent of exchange and prior to exchange: 
The rate at which two commodities exchange does not determine their value, but their value 
determines the rate at which they exchange…A quantity of labour has no value, is not a 
commodity, but is that which transforms commodities into values; it is their common substance; 
as manifestations of it commodities are qualitatively equal and only quantitatively different. They 
[appear] as expressions of definite quantities of social labour time (Marx 1972:134-135) 
Once this is accepted, the whole mystery of price is abolished: the deviation of price from value 
consists of nothing more or less than, to cite Marx from the Grundrisse, “a commodity, = x labour 
time, constantly commands > or < x labour time on the market.” Price is revealed as a form of value: 
the amount of abstract labour time which a commodity commands in the market, as a consequence of 
the complex interaction of supply, demand and all other social factors. It is, indeed, the quantitative 
expression of the sum total of all these factors. This is, inter alia, what allows us to formulate the 
concept of unequal exchange and indeed of distribution. A price that differs from value transfers 
abstract labour time (value) from the seller whose price is low to the seller whose price is high. The 
price system as a whole distributes a pre-given magnitude of social labour among buyers. Value is 
the means of quantifying these transfers: 
The ‘law of value’ thus governs a single substance in all its forms: commodity, money, means of 
production, means of consumption, and so on. Moreover this is unaffected by the non-
correspondence of supply and demand. It is a completely general reduction of heterogeneous 
magnitudes to a single quantifiable substance. 
 ‘LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE’ VERSUS ‘LAW OF VALUE’:  LAW IN MARX AND 
HEGEL AS A CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT OF REALITY 
We are approaching the point where we can contrast equilibrium with temporal determinations by 
asking what happens when supply and demand fail to equalise. I will show that this leads to a 
breakdown in Ricardo’s quantitative solution; that is, the Ricardian neglect of quality leads to a 
quantitative departure from Marx. This quantitative departure renders the Ricardian and the Marxian 
approach incompatible. They constitute, purely and simply, two different theories of value. 
Before this demonstration, however, it is useful to see how the point emerges in Marx’s own writings 
and to derive from this the two entirely different theories of the value-price relation and, indeed, of 
what a theory consist of. 
Modern writers use the term ‘labour theory of value’ amalgamating Marx with the very economists 
he so trenchantly criticised. Marx never used this term;
 12 his phrase was the ‘law of value’.
 This is 
neither incidental nor secondary to the topic.  
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The concept of ‘law’ is particularly central in Marx’s own work.  For both Hegel and Marx a law is 
an objectively-given relation through which essence expresses itself as appearance.
13  It is not 
something externally imposed on disparate objects, some kind of numerical relation that happens to 
hold between independent entities: over here we have value, over there we have price, and the law is 
an empirical relation between them. On the contrary, the fact that a lawlike relation exists between 
apparently distinct phenomena demonstrates that they partake of a common essence.
14 The law of 
value is, therefore, an indispensible element of what value is; it is a part of the definition of value, to 
be precise that part of its definition through which it acquires actuality, that which makes its 
appearance a grounded expression of its existence. It is, in a word, what makes value real.
15 
The relations which Marx here seeks to establish are not, therefore, mere statements about the 
concept of a law, in isolation from the concept of value. In demarcating his own concept of the law 
of value from Ricardo’s, Marx is demarcating a defining element of value itself, in particular the 
manner in which price, which appears to be external to value, is in fact a form of appearance of value 
despite their quantitative disparity. 
He begins, therefore, from the radical opposite standpoint of Ricardianism which concentrates on the 
purely quantitative relation that arises when demand equals supply, and iconoclastically asserts the 
‘no less invariable law’ that demand does not equal supply; that they ‘do not stand in any necessary 
relation’. 
In doing so he deals with reality. Marx’s concept of ‘accidental’ or ‘contingent’ is just as radically 
opposed to Ricardo’s as his concept of law itself. For the Ricardian school, since the law consists of 
equilibrium, the accidental consists of deviations from it. For Marx, on the contrary, equilibrium 
itself is accidental, and that which the Ricardians treat as an accident, Marx recognises as reality.  
The law of value is a law of motion: motion determines existence, not vice versa 
This conforms to Hegel’s profound observation that Becoming is the truth of Being; that which exists 
appears only through its own self-negation. The concept of law against which Marx polemicises 
corresponds to that which Hegel defines as an abstract or forced identity. 
But Marx’s law is therefore always a law of movement, in which real law the Ricardian law is ‘no 
more than an abstract, contingent as one-sided moment’. Value appears as price through the 
fluctuations of demand and supply which really take place, not in consequence of a static relation 
which does not take place. Consequently, the quantitative relation between value and price has to be 
expressed dynamically and investigated dynamically. It is not the level of values that governs prices 
but their movement. There therefore is no definite static relation between values and prices and the 
search for it is vain. Values govern prices dynamically, and over time. 
Leaving Las Vegas: determination and existence in economics 
This raises to the forefront the most difficult intellectual problem facing those trained in equilibrium 
thinking when they attempt to break free of its straitjacket, namely, outside of equilibrium, values 
appear ‘indeterminate’. This is indeed a problem and I will shortly show that it renders such values 
and prices incapable of representing reality. But in spite of this, equilibrium thinkers find themselves 
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the enthusiasm with which generations of indexers reference the ‘labour theory of value’ on pages where the words do not appear.  
13 Cf Hegel 1995:500 ‘The Law of Appearance’ 
14 This accords with common scientific usage even today. The ‘law of gravity’ expresses a relation between all objects partaking of the common 
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common German verb setzen, to set out, lay down or specify. That which is posited is gesetzt, laid down or specified. The many places where Marx 
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incapable of abandoning the conception. At the centre of this difficulty is the fact that equilibrium 
thinking and temporal thinking constitute two distinct paradigms: they give two different sets of 
meanings to the concepts involved. Most centrally, they involve different concepts of causation. 
In equilibrium, the price or the value of a commodity can be calculated algebraically, because 
equilibrium can only be sustained by a special set of exchange rates which do not change. This gives 
a special mathematical relation in which input prices equal output prices. Simultaneous equations can 
be written down and used to calculate values or prices using this ‘fact’ – that is, supposing something 
that never happens. For equilibrium thinking this constitutes a determination of value or price. 
But in consequence, the normal everyday meaning of ‘cause’ or ‘determination’ has been replaced by 
a completely different concept: algebraic calculation.
16 In normal language, one thing causes another 
because one thing leads to another; they succeed each other in time. Though this simple idea has to 
be refined, it remains the opposite of equilibrium determination, in which time has no place and has 
to be brought in externally. This idea is so well expressed by Sowell (1974:127) that it is worth citing 
if only to make clear that this is not a peculiar obsession of the TSS school: 
Methods of analysis depend on some assumptions – implicit or explicit – about causation, and 
some preconception as to what kinds of phenomena should be explained. Causation can be 
thought of as sequential (A causes B causes C), as simultaneous mutual determination (as in 
Walrasian general equilibrium), or as a confluence of ‘tendencies’ whose net result may bear little 
resemblance to any of the individual elements…during the classical period, both orthodox and 
dissenting economists tended to conceive of causation in a sequential sense – as distinguished 
from simultaneous equilibrium – though only Sismondi formalized this in period analysis. 
When simultaneous determination is abandoned, equilibrium thinkers fall into an abyss where 
nothing is known. It seems as if, without the comforting but illusory faith of an ordered, stable and 
unchanging exchange of equivalents, nothing is left but chance and caprice. David Laibman (1999) 
has argued, for example, that temporal determination in effect deprives economics of any theory at 
all. 
But the wildest casinos have laws, and  just as a great deal can be said about the universe without 
hypothesing a God, a great deal can be known about the most chaotic of markets without presuming 
that they are perfect.
17 There is nothing to stop us determining the value of a commodity outside of 
equilibrium, once we stop making equilibrium a necessary part of its determination.  
All we need do, as already indicated, is add together the constant capital consumed in its 
manufacture, measured in hours and given by its price at the time of use, and the living labour 
applied to this constant capital, likewise measured in hours. That is, all we need do is confine our 
attention to the ‘immediate process of production’ itself, from which the commodity emerges with a 
clearly-defined value irrespective of, and independent of, whether it is sold and for how much it is 
sold.  
In a nutshell, this is the TSS interpretation: it is completely determinate, since we have not imposed 
any prior requirement on input prices. The price of constant capital comes from simple observation: 
if a capitalist combines £100 in cotton with 1000 hours of labour, and if £10 represents 10 hours of 
social labour, then the value of the yarn is 1000 +1000 = 2000 hours. 
Given the price of the cotton, this is a completely determinate calculation of the value of the yarn. 
Such a procedure is universal in the rest of science. No astronomer, in calculating the position which 
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a planet will occupy in the year 2000, demands to know why this planet is in its current position. 
S/he takes the current position and motion as given, and predicts the future from it. All laws of 
motion take this form. We need only know the initial conditions at some definite point in time, and 
the whole of the rest of the motion can be as determinate as we wish, depending only on the 
complexity and concreteness of the empirical laws we assert. 
In passing we should note that it is a complete misnomer to treat the distinction between the above 
and equilibrium valuations as a distinction between ‘historical’ and ‘current’ cost. The value 
transferred to the product is not given by the magnitude of capital when purchased; it is given by the 
magnitude of this capital when it is used. This is its ‘current’ cost. The equilibrium determination 
substitutes a completely different notion, redefining the word ‘current’ to mean ‘future’; it says that 
the value transferred by the cotton is given by what the cotton will cost when it has been produced 
using a technology that does not exist at the time it is used. It redefines also the word ‘necessary’ to 
usurp Marx’s meaning, as I show in Appendix II. ‘Necessary’ for Marx means that which can be 
achieved under existing social conditions, that is, using the machinery which is now in place. 
Necessary for the equilibrium approach means that which can be achieved under ideal social 
conditions, that is, using the most advanced machinery in existence whether or not it is in place. 
The whole idea appears perverse only to economists of the equilibrium persuasion, who appear to 
feel that reality is too important to leave to nature. The equilibrium calculation cannot accept that the 
price of the cotton is simply what we find on the market. It has to determine not just the results of 
production but its preconditions, insisting that the cotton must enter production at the same price it 
leaves it. There is no reason in nature to suppose this; the only reason is that, on the basis of faith 
alone, it is alleged to approximate nature better than nature herself.  In fact, it does not approximate 
nature better than nature does, as I will shortly demonstrate. The method of equilibrium fails the 
most basic test of science: it cannot explain what we actually observe. 
There is no reason at all to suppose, just because the cotton cost £100 in 2000 when the new crop 
emerges, that it has to have cost £100 in 1999 when the old crop entered the yarn. Unless, of course, 
one is unable to determine the ‘price’ of the cotton otherwise, because this assumption is the only 
one which makes the equations work. But once we bend to this requirement, we have already lost the 
battle with nature: we have opted to confine nature instead of expanding our brains. When we do 
that, nature has won: our own pettiness has deprived us of the right to be the masters of our own 
spirit. 
The relation between value and price is not lawless; it is the subject of laws of motion. Precisely 
because value regulates price over time, there is no instantaneous relation between them – any more 
than the law of gravity requires the moon to be in a particular position. This does not mean there is 
no quantitative relation between value and price; it means that no a priori restriction is placed on this 
quantitative relation, so it can be the subject of a genuine empirical investigation. For the first time it 
opens the way to the formulation of genuine laws based on observation instead of pseudo-laws based 
on calculation. 
Ricardian values are indeterminate outside of equilibrium 
Let us now contrast this with the Ricardian formulation.
18 This argues, essentially, that value can 
only appear as price when supply equals demand. The consequences have been somewhat 
incompletely digested by modern economics. The problem is this: how does value appear when 
supply is not equal to demand? The issue is not so much that equilibrium values are in this situation 
in some sense abberant or awkward to handle: they are not even defined. 
What happens when the economy does not conform to the contingent state in which value is equal to 
price? What can be said, from the Ricardian point of view, about a real economy, in which ‘demand 
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and supply are never equal, or only coincidentally’? Actually, nothing at all. Value is indeterminate, 
price is what we see in the marketplace, et voilà tout. No solvable set of equations for the magnitude 
of either value or price exists, unless supply and demand are equal. 
A mountain of metaphysical balderdash has been heaped on this simple fact. The most central point 
has been disguised; namely, the equilibrium determination of any magnitude does not determine this 
magnitude outside of equilibrium. 
The origin of a dogma 
This is not understood to be a problem by most economists, who in effect declare that it doesn’t 
matter: we can calculate values and prices ‘as if’ supply equalled demand. To understand the 
difficulty, let us apply the same reasoning in a different context. What would we think of a grocer 
who sold us some carrots which would weigh a pound if the scales balanced, but refused to actually 
weigh them? Or worse still, popped a pound weight on the scale, grabbed the bag as the pointer 
swung past zero, and claimed to have weighed out a pound of carrots? 
It cannot be insisted enough that, though the analogy of a balance is a complete commonplace in 
economics it is actually completely inappropriate. Scales can actually be observed at rest but the 
market cannot. Weighing supposes circumstances which really exist. Ricardian values suppose 
circumstances which cannot exist. The equilibrium determination of weight is rooted in reality; the 
equilibrium determination of price is rooted out of the imagination. 
Faced with this, economics makes a leap of faith. First it asserts, without proof, that we can use the 
data from an out-of-equilibrium economy to calculate the values and prices which would pertain if 
the economy were at rest – and, we should note, ‘rest’ implies a completely different set of economic 
proportions, since for example any shortfall implies that a sector of production is insufficiently 
developed to meet need. Second, it asserts again without proof that this is justifiable because such 
equilbrium prices regulate observed prices, appealling to vague arguments that all science makes 
abstraction and everyone approximates. Third, and most damning, it ignores contrary evidence that is 
plain for the whole world to see – cyclic crisis, growing inequality, and a blatant failure of markets to 
work the way they are ‘supposed’ to – and constructs esoteric empirical ‘proofs’ that its predictions 
regulate reality which, on closer examination turn, out to be internally circular and produce nothing 
but purely logical facts, of the same empirical worth as the proposition that all four sides of a square 
have the same length.
19 
Let us take these ideas one by one. First, just because everyone makes abstractions, it doesn’t mean 
that any abstraction will do; we must distinguish good abstractions from bad. Abstractions like 
Marx’s begin from the general properties of things that really exist. Abstractions like Ricardo’s begin 
from the particular properties of things that can never exist. Marx’s is better; indeed the Ricardian 
construction actually has no foundation in reality; it is a circular mind exercise. Why do equilibrium 
prices approximate real prices? Because we define real prices as an accident, so that any actual 
deviation must be the result of an exogenous factor. There is no logical proof at all involved. 
Second, how can any law of motion of values or prices be asserted? The modern variant of Ricardian 
equilibrium, comparative statics, attempts to define a law of motion as a succession of instantaneous 
equilibria. But how can such a set of equilibria participate in any dynamic determination of price 
either by value or by Ricardian or Walrasian equal-profit-rate prices? In order for prices to move, 
they must depart from equilibrium. The process of transition requires that goods trade at prices 
different from those of the theory. But this means that these prices are not actually prices at all, in 
any normal sense of the word. They are not actually the rate at which goods exchange on the market. 
Moreover and most decisively, if goods were to exchange at these prices, all the magnitudes involved 
would be different, as we shall shortly show. The contradiction leaps to the surface once we ask the 
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simple question: how could a real economy actually move from one state to another, using these 
prices? 
Third, what would constitute an empirical falsification of the proposition that either Marxian 
comparative static values or Sraffian/Walrasian prices regulate observed prices? We have already 
seen that the Ricardian conception is obliged to treat every deviation from equilibrium as an 
accident. In modern economics this takes the form of treating deviations from prediction as 
exogenous. When the economy deviates from ‘perfection’ this is never treated as an endogenous 
consequence of its motion; it is treated as a ‘shock’, as the result of political interference, as an 
‘imperfection’, in short as something non-economic. But on this basis one can explain anything. By 
definition if the market doesn’t behave as the economists predict, something other than economics 
must be to blame. Consequently, the propositions of economics as such can never be tested, and 
never are. 
This emperor has never had any clothes. All that is left, for the Ricardian argument, is to assert as a 
matter of faith that the real world is by definition an approximation to the imaginary world of 
equilibrium, and to explain all departures from this imaginary world as ‘imperfections’ or – in 
Marx’s terms – ‘accidents’. Moreover this particular aspect of Ricardian reasoning has become the 
common heritage of virtually the whole of economics, apart from its heterodox fringes. Modern 
economics in effect defines the real world as an accident. This is a true dogma; an unverifiable 
proposition which, by its very nature, cannot be tested, and can only be accepted as a matter of faith 
or creed. 
The comparative static, or equilibrium ‘determination’ of price and value is a pure dogma, of the 
same epistemological status as the assertion that God’s existence is proved by personal faith: an 
assertion for which not only is there no evidence, but for which evidence cannot possibly be 
presented, by virtue of the nature of the assertion. 
THE DIFFERENCE MAKES A DIFFERENCE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF QUALITY 
INTO QUANTITY IN THE ABSENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM 
The first difficulty in disputing any theory which is held as a matter of faith is in demonstrating that 
an alternative way of thinking is even possible, since faith organises itself to shut out doubt. The first 
shots in any battle against totalitarian orthodoxy come not from the cannons of reason but the 
popguns of toleration. 
I have approached the problem first by demonstrating that TSS is a possible interpretation of Marx’s 
value theory; that there is a coherent reading of Marx’s own texts which leads to the twin conclusions 
that Marx’s values were temporal, and that money stands in them in the role of the general 
representative of abstract labour, in which form capital enters the transformation process.  
I now contrast this interpretation with the equilibrium interpretation of Marx, including specific 
numerical examples that demonstrate the quantitative disparities that result. 
I will show that under these conditions the qualitative difference between Marx and Ricardo leads to 
quantitative discrepancies. I shall show that this quantitative discrepancy results because the 
comparative static method fails to yield a determination of value by the magnitude of labour time. I 
shall finally show that the comparative static method in its own terms is internally incoherent and 
fails to provide a determination either of prices, or of values, that is consonsant with any possible 
reality. 
In sum, Marx interpreted temporally is coherent and consonant with reality; Marx interpreted as a 
Ricardian is incoherent; Ricardo interpreted as a Ricardian is incoherent and inconsonant with 
reality.  1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  17 
If we wish to understand either Marx, or reality, no Ricardian interpretation of anything works. The 
appropriate procedure for any scientific endeavour is to abandon the Ricardian project and re-assess 
Marx’s. 
There is a difficulty of saying what the Ricardian approach means, outside of Ricardian asusmptions. 
Equilibrium interpretations of Marx exhibit a peculiar dichotomy: they determine value statically and 
apply it dynamically. In consequence, they never enquire whether the motion of the system might 
modify the determination of value – which, in a certain sense, is the entire issue. We confront the 
problem that we cannot criticise what they say about value in a moving economy, because they don’t 
say anything about value in a moving economy. 
I shall concentrate, as far as I can, not on what Marx’s critics or interpreters have said, but on what is 
logically possible on the basis of the most universally-accepted generalisation of the equilibrium 
determination of value, the comparative static method. Thus my arguments are not, on the whole, 
directed against specific critics or interpreters of Marx (though where necessary I shall refer to them) 
but against what, I hope to show, are the necessary logical consequences for the determination of 
value, of interpreting Marx in a comparative static manner.  
Comparative static and temporal definitions of value under changing productivity 
We first deal with rising productivity, supposing a market economy producing a single good with 
steady technical change, such that with a constant labour force, outputs and inputs rise continuously 
but outputs rise faster than inputs. For simplicity we suppose workers consume nothing.
20 We 
suppose the entire product each year is invested, for maximum clarity. 
We have chosen a sequence (see Table 1) generating whole numbers but the reader can obtain the 
same qualitative results for any sequence satisfying these assumptions. 




Produces  X (use-
value) 
1  10  10  ￿  12 
2  12  10  ￿  15 
3  15  10  ￿  20 
4  20  10  ￿  28 
      Table 1: use-value, maximum expanded reproduction 
where C = consumed constant capital, L = quantity of labour power, and X = output 
The comparative static calculation yields table 2.
21 For example, for period 1,
22 we have  
  10 × v1
 + 10 = 12 × v1
 
that is  v1 = 10/ (12 – 10) = 5 
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Period  v  C hours  L 
hours 
Equals  X 
hours 
1  5  50  10  =  60 
2  3.33  40  10  =  50 
3  2  30  10  =  40 
4  1.25  25  10  =  35 
    Table 2: simultaneous values 
A number of conclusions are taken as ‘standard’ in the normal interpretation of Marx: 
Conclusion 1: values are directly determined by the use-value structure of the economy. For 
each row in table 1 there is only one possible row in table 2. Values are ‘redundant’; use-values 
determine all the properties of the economy. 
Conclusion 2: organic composition falls, and the rate of profit rises, with technical progress. 
Profit is directly given by the physical structure of the economy, so we just subtract the physical 










C   
1  10  12  2  0.2000 
2  12  15  3  0.2500 
3  15  20  5  0.3333 
4  20  28  8  0.4000 
  Table 3: physical profit rate 
These conclusions are quite conventional in the simultaneous paradigm. However, a number of 
stranger conclusions spring to the eye. 
Conclusion 3: values so defined cannot function as prices.  Although values are defined as special 
prices, they cannot function as such. The product at the end of period 1 is sold for 5 hours per unit. 
But when used as an input in period 2, it is bought for 3
1/3 hours per unit. These prices cannot sustain 
actual exchange. 
Conclusion 4: the value added to the total product is not equal to the time worked. At the 
beginning, we had 50 hours worth of input. Consider the combined effect, now, of periods 1 and 2. 
No product was consumed except in production. Living labour added 10 hours in each period, 20 
altogether. We should have 70 hours worth of product. But we only have 50. 20 hours have been lost.  
Conclusion 5: the value added depends on the length of the period: If we double the accounting 
period by amalgamating periods 1 and 2, we find that 22 units of C combined with 20 units of labour 
produce 27 units of output giving v = 4. Now 20 hours have been added to the product.  
The period is an arbitrary accounting construct: it is hardly surprising the organic composition falls, 
if we can throw away half the value of the capital whenever we feel like it. 
Conclusion 6: value can be created from nothing. It is common for the problem of value loss to be 
dismissed, or even welcomed, because it does not make extra value appear. But if we suppose a 
decrease, instead of an increase, in productivity, then the inputs to each period will be greater than 
the output of the last period. Moreover, the greater the decrease, the more value from nowhere, so 
that the most productive approach is to do nothing at all but wait for nature to make inert copies of 
itself. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  19 
Monetarising the simultaneous value concept 
How could such an economy function according to sensible market rules, that is, in such a way that 
the money paid for a commodity is equal to the money received for it? What happens if  we ask 
equilibrium values to live up to their claims and function as prices? 
This would happen if, for example, at the end of period 1 we purchased one hour of labour with 
$60/40 = $1.5; if at the end of period 2 we devalued by a further 50/30 , at the end of period 3 by a 
further 40/25, and so on. Defining e to be the ratio between dollars and hours w have:  
e0 = 1 
e1 = 60/40 = 1.5 
e2 = 60/40 × 50/30 = 2.5 
e3 = 60/40 × 50/30 × 40/25 = 4 
and we can write a table of money transactions in this money, thus: 
Period  $p per 
unit 
$C  $L  Equals  $X 
1  5  50  10    60 
2  5  60  15    75 
3  5  75  25    100 
4  5  100  40    140 
  Table 4: corn-money; monetarising simultaneism 
Now we have a set of transactions that makes monetary sense: the money paid for everything is equal 
to the money received for it. It also yields the same profit rates as table 2. But we have revalued the 
contribution of labour-power in each period by an amount exactly equal to the increment in its 
productivity. In consequence, the prices, down the lefthand side, are simply ‘corn-prices’; they use 
the commodity itself, instead of labour, as numéraire. The only difference between a simultaneous 
‘labour-value’ system and corn-values is the numéraire; when we adjust this correctly  in each period 
to permit values to function as prices, there is no difference. Simultaneous valuation yields a use-
value concept of value. 
An incoherent measure 
One further point: this procedure is in general incoherent for more than one sector. If, for example, 
the output of period 1 yields values of (1,2) and the next period requires input values of (2,3) then no 
monetarisation makes exchange possible. This reflects the fact that, because use-values are 
heterogeneous, there is no unique coherent use-value measure. 
In such circumstances, of course, goods might exchange at prices other than values, a circumstance 
we will shortly study. But this does not wish away the problem; prices might also be (1,2) followed 
by (2,3) and could not serve as the basis of exchange. Moreover it renders incoherent any idea that 
value is a special kind of price. Finally this is not the result of capital mobility but of technical 
change tout court: yet another nail in the coffin of the idea, rejected in Appendix III, that Volume I of 
Capital refers to a mythical economy where goods exchange at values. 
The temporal calculation 
The temporal calculation permits outputs to differ in value from inputs. These are given, not by 
solving a simultaneous equation but a difference equation corresponding to the temporal order of the 
circuit 
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We suppose an initial value v0, as with any difference equation, which reflects a past history we do 
not know. It can be demonstrated that any errors that might result decay exponentially. Here, for 
illustration, we begin with the simultaneous value, 5. In period 1, we then calculate v1
 as follows: 
  10v0 + 10 = 12v1 
that is  10 × 5 + 10 = 12v1 
giving   v1 = 5 
So far this is the same. However in the next period we find 
that is  12 × 5 + 10 = 15v2 
giving   v2 = 4
2/3 
This is greater than the simultaneous value, but less than the old value. Value has declined, but has 
not fallen as far as in Table 2. This gives a distinct value rate of profit, different from the use-value 















C   
1  5  50  10  12  60  10  0.2000 
2  4
2/3  60  10  15  70  10  0.1667 
3  4  70  10  20  80  10  0.1429 
4  3
3/14  80  10  28  90  10  0.1250 
      Table 5: temporal values 
Values still fall, but more slowly, and so the profit rate falls exactly as Marx suggests, despite the 
steady cheapening of commodities. The ‘experts’ are wrong; there is no logical error in Marx’s idea. 
Moreover: 
Goods are bought for exactly the amount of money for which they sell. This system is compatible 
with an exchange economy. 
No value is ‘lost’ and no value appears from nowhere. The only source of value is living labour. 
A variable numéraire is not required for the economy to behave in a reasonable monetary manner. 
The value contribution of labour-power is always exactly given by the time of labour. 
Value added is independent of the accounting period. 
Static and temporal definitions under a changing MELT 
If the MELT is changing from one period to the next, the difference between simultaneous and 
temporal approaches is this: does the same MELT apply at the beginning, as at the end,  of the 
period? If so, value appears in circulation. To demonstrate this I use the assumptions and notation in 
Moseley (1993); since his MELT calculation is the same as the New Solution this brings out the 
contradiction in both approaches. I may have reproduced these wrongly, but I can be corrected: my 
aim is a clarification of the temporal-simultaneous distinction rather than a refutation of Moseley’s 
calculation. 
We suppose simple reproduction, with constant conditions of production. Values are thus constant 
and the choice of so-called ‘replacement’ or ‘current’ cost cannot affect the outcome. Following 
Moseley, only values are presented so that the results are indifferent to the use-value structure. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  21 
We begin by supposing 100 hours constant capital are consumed in each period with 100 hours of 
living labour, so that output is 200 hours. Suppose one half the output is consumed by either workers 
or capitalists, and the rest re-invested, re-creating the original conditions. We use Moseley’s notation, 
with Lp for constant capital in hours and C in money, N for labour power, and P for output in money. 
In all periods therefore: 
  100(Lp) hours + 100 (N) hours => 200 hours 
Suppose that in price terms: 
Period 1: $100(C) and 100 hours (N)  => $200 (P) 
Define the MELT, m, as money value added ($100) divided by living labour (100 hours), so m =1. 
No inconsistency arises so far. However, now suppose that in period 2, outputs sell for $180: 
Period 2: $100(C) and 100 hours (N)  => $180 (P) 
Money value added is now $80, so m = $0.80/hour. Now there is a problem: if m is to be constant 
throughout, $1 has to represent the same amount of value at both beginning and end of period 2, 
namely 1.25 hours. But all magnitudes of value must conform to the same relation; every hour must 
be represented by $0.80. However, $100 was paid for period 2’s inputs. Therefore, the value they 
contribute to the product must have been 125 hours, not 100 hours. The value equation must be 
rewritten in the light of the prices assigned by circulation to the outputs. It should read: 
Period 2: 125(Lp) + 100(N) = 225 hours 
But these same inputs make up half of what was produced in period 1, when their value was half the 
output of that period or 100 hours. Circulation has created 25 hours of extra value. Constant capital 
has been revalued by deflation – moreover, after being consumed. The inescapable conclusion is that 
the value of inputs depends on the price level when the outputs are sold. Indeed it is not even 
determinate until the output is sold: only when we ascertain that the output of period 2 is sold at $180 
can we value this period’s inputs. This is stronger even than the proposition normally made by the 
value-form school, that the value of a commodity is determined when that commodity is sold. If flax 
is used to make linen, then the value of the flax is now unknown until the linen has been sold. 
Finally value now depends on the money of account. If, for example, we specified prices in Yen and 
this deflated half as fast as the $, the value of inputs would be lower. 
Transformation is not just Marx’s problem: Sraffian prices and real exchange 
The most insistent claim in the modern debate around value theory is that the transformation problem 
is unique to Marx, because only he explains price in terms of a concealed essence. Implicitly this 
makes a false claim for both marginalist and Sraffian prices, namely, that they are the same as real 
prices and that, therefore, nothing is concealed and nothing needs to be transformed.  
Nothing could be farther from the truth. These prices are not only distinct from actual prices but 
cannot be otherwise because as we have seen they cannot serve as the basis of any possible 
exchange. Actual prices do not equal Sraffian or Walrasian prices, actual employment does not equal 
the ‘natural employment rate’, actual inflation does not equal the natural unaccelerated rate, and 
these differences have to be explained both empirically and practically. The transformation problem 
belongs to all economics, whose two opposed value systems both explain what we can directly 
observe as an effect of something we cannot directly observe. The one must therefore be transformed 
into the other. How? 
The equilibrium answer, we have seen, is intrinsically dogmatic: by definition, what we observe 
directly must be an accidental deviation from equilibrium. I will show that this is not possible; that is, 
on Sraffian assumptions, in general no set of actual prices can behave in this way. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  22 
We approach this with a simple question: under what circumstances can Sraffian prices form the 
actual basis of exchange, and if we compensate for their failure to do so, what becomes of the 
standard Sraffian assumptions? To highlight the problem we suppose, as one always must do in 
investigating the real contradictions of an equilibrium hypothesis, a secular change in the technical 
coefficients. Consider a two-sector economy with constant labour inputs, and a constant department 
II, but where department I steadily consumes and produces more use-values. 
Table 6 is an example which the reader can easily extend to later time periods. C and L are the total 
use of capital and Labour respectively, c and l are the technical coefficients. 
t  C(I)  C(II)  L(I)  L(II)  X(I)  X(II)  c(I)  c(II)  l(I)  l(II) 
1  10  20  20  10  30  30  0.33  0.67  0.67  0.33 
2  11  20  20  10  32  30  0.34  0.63  0.67  0.33 
3  12  20  20  10  34  30  0.35  0.59  0.67  0.33 
4  13  20  20  10  36  30  0.36  0.56  0.67  0.33 
    Table 6: two-sector economy, use-values and technical coefficients 
With a real wage of 0.5, equilibrium equal-profit-rate prices and profits yielded by this sequence, in 
terms of labour units as numéraire, are given in table 7: 
r  p(I)  p(II) 
0.37  0.84  1 
0.39  0.89  1 
0.40  0.93  1 
0.42  0.97  1 
        Table 7: Sraffian prices from table 6 
These prices cannot be used for any actual exchange. The output of department I from period 1 is 
sold for 0.84 per unit. But in the next period it is purchased at 0.89. No known form of exchange 
permits the seller to receive 5 cents less than the buyer pays. 
Against this, the implicit argument in equilibrium reasoning is to say that, although such prices 
cannot function as the actual basis of exchange, they can nevertheless empirically approximate an 
actual sequence of exchanges. 
But they cannot. A sequence of exchanges which is approximated by Sraffian prices, and conforms 
to Sraffian assumptions, cannot exist. It is logically impossible for equilibrium to serve as the 
regulator of any actual sequence of market prices without violating one or other of the fundamental 
principles of the approach. Either the rate of profit fails to equalise and in fact diverges, or the actual 
sequence of prices diverges from Sraffian prices. 
We illustrate this with two possible sequences that might be regulated by Sraffian prices. First, 
suppose that at the beginning of each period, the capitalists purchase their goods for the offer price of 
the previous period. In that case we have to recalculate the profits of each period as the difference 
between actual sales and actual purchases. Then, as an alternative, let’s suppose that in each period 
the profit rate is given by the Sraffian calculation – which should be fair enough, since profit rates 
are supposed to be a function of physical magnitudes alone – and recalculate prices, by adding a 
markup yielding this rate to the cost of inputs at actual prices. 
Figure 1 shows the graphs of sectoral profit rates resulting from assumption 1, compared with the 
predicted Sraffian profits. Figure 2 shows the graph of sectoral prices resulting from assumption 2, 
compared with predicted Sraffian prices. In the first case, the sectoral profit rates diverge, and indeed 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  23 
become negative in sector 2. In what sense, then, are Sraffian profits the regulator of observed 
profits? In Figure 2 the sectoral prices diverge, in one case becoming systematically higher than 
Sraffian prices and the other case systematically lower. In what sense are Sraffian prices their 
regulator? 
 





























































































Marx’s prices of production 
The Sraffian may ask whether the same problems arise when prices of production are calculated, 
temporally, on the basis we attribute to Marx. In a certain sense the question is misguided, but the 
answer is ‘yes’. From a TSS perspective there is no requirement to  ‘determine’ prices and therefore 
prices of production can be calculated for any price sequence. Any set of money prices serves as the 
basis of actual exchange because the TSS assumption is that goods are purchased for the same price 
that they are sold at.
23 There is no requirement that the rate of profit should actually equalise. Prices 
of production arise from the formation of an average, not a uniformly equal, profit rate, and they are 
calculated therefore in the following way: 
                                                 
23 It says something for the current theoretical state of economics that one has to state this as an assumption. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  24 
calculate the value of both constant and capital at the market prices prevailing when production 
begins, reducing these to abstract labour using the MELT 
calculate the mass of profit as living labour less variable capital 
calculate the rate of profit as the above mass, divided by the sum of constant and variable capital 
calculate prices of production in value terms by applying this profit rate to the value of capital in 
each sector, as calculated in step (i) 
This yields prices of production but to iterate the sequence we require the MELT for the next period. 
This is obtained by the following steps: 
calculate the total price of outputs at the market prices prevailing when production ends 
calculate the total value of outputs by adding living labour to constant capital 
Divide the result of (v) by the result of (vi) 
The direction of derivation is therefore the reverse of the Sraffian method, in that the calculation 
proceeds always on the basis of actual market prices, but reduces them to abstract labour, production 
prices apply the average profit, so yielded, to sectoral costs. There is of course no dispute that 
production prices could themselves act as the basis of exchange, since any set of prices can do so. 
However, this is not the primary purpose of the category of production price, as appendix III shows. 
The decisive point is the relation between an arbitrary set of market prices and the underlying prices 
of production. To illustrate this we have randomised market prices and present the movement of 
prices of production beside the market prices that they shadow. The procedure for randomisation was 
as follows: for each sector, calculate a random markup between 0 and 0.8; add this to costs at 
purchase price, and divide by total output. TSS prices of production were calculated as indicated 
above. 
Figure 4 shows the resultant market prices, compared with TSS prices of production, in sector I and 
Figure 5 shows the same in sector II. 
The regulation of market price by production price: an empirical law 
We make no claim, of course, that a Monte Carlo exercise of this nature provides actual information 
about the law of value as it operates empirically in the world – though the same exercise can be 
undertaken, using the calculation specified above, for empirical data, using the method for example 
specified in Freeman (1997) which extends the calculation to account for the presence of stocks. 
However, it illustrates two vital concluding point about the possible form that this empirical law can 
take. First of all, though market prices clearly ‘track’ production prices, the correspondence is by no 
means exact. Although it is the case that the general tendency of the two sets of prices is the same – 
that is, they move together – it is easy to construct market price sequences in which, for example, 
market prices are systematically higher than production prices. 
The question then arises: what actually happens? In the world we live in, do market prices shadow 
production prices in every sector, do they shadow them only in some sectors, does this vary 
depending on market régime, and so on: that is, we confront a phenomenon that genuinely depends 
on empirical circumstance: it is not a purely logical construct, as is the instantaneous correspondence 
between price and vertically-integrated labour coefficients identified by writers such as Ochoa, 
Petrovic, Cockshott and Cottrell, Steedman and Shaikh (0000) (see Freeman 1997 and Kliman’s 
paper to this conference for a proof of this point) 
In my view this is how Marx viewed the actual regulation of market prices by prices of production. 
When he writes about this phenomenon, he refers always carefully to empirical circumstance and 
clearly has in mind actual sequences of prices that he has carefullys studied; to the extent that he 
considered this process of regulation lasted over the duration of the entire industrial cycle. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  25 
A law of motion is not a static law 
Finally, how might such a law operate? Clearly, there cannot be any instantaneous correspondence 
between market prices and either values or prices of production, because supply does not equal 
demand. Consequently, a discrepancy produces a counter-tendency; if a market price stands above its 
corresponding price of production this will manifest itself as a surplus-profit, and will form a pole of 
attraction for capital. Conversely a lower market price will cause a lower than average profit and 
provoke an outflow. This much is obvious and recognised by all but there is a further obvious point 
that is not recognised by all: the process takes time. Factories cannot be assembled at will or 
dismantled on command. In cases of accelerated technical innovation (IT in the current phase, Steel 
and Electricity in the second Kontradieff, etc), a shortfall can last an entire epoch and can serve as a 
long-standing motor of motion. 
The real task of economic analysis is to establish the dynamic laws of this motion. However, this 
cannot be done in purely nominal terms. If nominal money prices were the only factor affecting 
profits or investment behaviour, then the most rational economic course would be hyperinflation, 
creating giant nominal profits. The true laws of motion of the economy are not just governed by 
nominal prices. This is why a value concept is needed; this is why we must distinguish the nominal 
from ‘something else’ that underlies it. Neoclassical economics, however, unquestioningly and 
dogmatically supposes that there is only one possible measure of this ‘something else’ – an 
incoherent use-value measure derived from the assumption of an impossible perfection. 
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But there is a better measure of this ‘something else’ – Marx’s values. These relate directly to the 
most universal element of the productive process, the element that in fact defines what production 
consists of: labour. It provides a direct behavioural link to the basic process of wage-bargaining. It 
cuts the Gordian knot in the endless controversies between Keynesians and their rivals, as to whether 
workers bargain over real or nominal wages: what workers bargain over is labour time: the first 
question anyone asks when considering a salary is ‘how long must I work to obtain what I want’. It 
permits a clear distinction between increases in output – the greater utilisation of productive 
resources –increases in productivity – an increase in the use-value output resulting from the 
application of labour – and nominal price increases – a merely inflationary increase in the price level, 
measured properly, not against the volume of use-values but against the labour content of the 
product. 
Until now only one argument has been applied in economics to avoid confronting this practical, 
theoretically coherent and empirically meaningful alternative: that the author of this idea, Karl Marx, 
committed unsolvable logical errors which could not be recovered from. 
We have shown that this provably false idea arises because Marx has been saddled with the very 
theoretical errors that give rise to the persistent failure of economics itself.  It is time to consider 
Marx, the founder of modern political economy , in his own right and to accord his work the place it 
deserves.Appendices 
APPENDIX I: INTERPRETATION VERSUS HERMENEUTICS 
Before we can assess any author’s ideas, we have to confirm that these ideas correspond to our 
understanding of them.
24 As indicated, the understanding of this paper is based on an interpretation 
of Marx: the temporal single-system or TSS interpretation of Marx’s theory of value.
25  
This should not be confused with hermeneutics, or trying to derive truth from texts. It stands apart 
from the dominant tradition of Marx-interpretation which we term solipsism, imposing the writer’s 
meaning on Marx’s words. Interpretations provide an essential function by supplying a meaning to 
the terms in a theory which are coherent with the intentions of its author. Both hermeneutic text-
trading, and solipsistic refusals to consider the meaning of terms in a theory, reduce to the same 
dogmatic belief, that the only thing Marx could possibly have meant is what the writer thinks he 
meant. 
Because this point is misunderstood, TSS writers are often accused of a dogmatic or scholastic 
approach, as for example in Foley (1999): 
The TSS literature also has a curiously scholastic and obscurantist vision of theoretical practice, 
for example, the idea that a highly technical reinterpretation of the labor theory of value can 
unlock secret insights into the nature of capitalism hidden in Marx's text. 
The problem is the exact opposite: it is to finish once and for all with the schismatic proliferation of 
scholastic dogmas based on interpretations of Marx, by insisting Marx speak for himself. Nothing 
could be more obscurantist or dogmatic than existing highly esoteric, highly technical and highly 
erroneous readings of Marx; to accept this without question is precisely to perpetuate it. 
The issue is not just Marx but the way economics views truth. Its dominant method is to appeal to 
authority: to cite writers as if, because of their eminence, their views become evidence about the 
world. The usual treatment of Marx does not question the method of appeal to authority, but seeks 
instead to set up alternative sources of it, ‘demonstrating’ that Marx’s theory cannot be completed on 
                                                 
24 We refer extensively to Ricardian theory (that is, the theory of the Ricardian school as defined by Marx) , without presenting much evidence that it 
was Ricardo’s own view. This is because Marx himself offers this evidence. Of course, this is only an interpretation of Ricardo: Marx’s. In this paper, 
‘Ricardian’ is a shorthand for Marx’s interpretation of Ricardo. 
25 See, for example, Freeman and Carchedi (1995) 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  27 
its own terms. Authors can then live under his mantle whilst promoting their own theories as a 
necessary improvement on his, and their own eminence as the originators of the improvement.  This 
perfectly excuses the rest of academia, which defends its own dogma by systematically suppressing 
its most effective critic with a claim that his theory is logically flawed – applied, however, not to that 
theory, but to the interpretations of self-appointed disciples. 
The solution is to distinguish once for all between the theory itself and its interpretations. To ensure 
no-one poses as Marx on earth, he has to be read in his own right, in the clear understanding that 
every writer in the last analysis speaks only for her or himself.  
TSS is not a new orthodoxy; it spells the end to all orthodoxy. It is a specific interpretation of Marx’s 
theory; it is not Marx’s theory. The reader can only judge Marx’s theory by reading, citing, and 
interpreting, Marx himself. 
All readers interpret a theory; the point, however, is not to change it 
Does this mean everyone is free to read, interpret or cite Marx as they choose? No: intepretations are 
unavoidable but we can judge between them. Even solipsists interpret: they just don’t admit it. 
Rather than wish it away we should be conscious of interpretation, distinguish it from the original, 
and cease excluding the alternatives by ignoring the problem. 
But what are the criteria for judging an interpretation? It does not reduce to finding scriptural 
quotations; we must ask whether the texts make sense, and whether the conclusions in them hang 
together or contradict each other, given the meaning we attach to them. 
We can illustrate by considering Marx’s famous ‘first equality’: “the sum of prices of production for 
the commodities produced in society as a whole – taking the totality of all branches of production – 
is equal to the sum of their values” (Marx 1981:P259)  
From a Ricardian standpoint, value is a special kind of price, a ratio between use-values. For Marx, 
price is a form of value, a ratio between quantities of abstract labour embodied prior to exchange.  
These two ideas assign a completely different meaning to the two key words in the citation. In a 
Ricardian framework this appears as an arbitrary ‘normalisation condition’. Why indeed should there 
be any special relation between the sum of one set of money prices and the sum of another set of 
money prices? But for Marx anything other than the first equality is nonsense: each and every set of 
possible prices is nothing other than a redistribution of the same total amount of pre-given social 
labour, the labour embodied in the commodities being priced. 
One need only pose the question in this way to see that the reading of the same set of words depends 
entirely on the meaning assigned to them: that is, to the interpretation applied. But one may also use 
this to make a judgement on which is more likely: (1) after practically burying himself in the British 
Museum for a decade, Marx in desperation plucks a numéraire from the sky to make Ricardo’s 
arithmetic work? Or (2) after a profound critique of political economy, he reconstructs the category 
of price from first principles, reducing all prices to claims on total social labour in circulation and 
revealing that their sum is a necessary invariant of circulation, because any set of prices simply 
constitutes a different division of the same aggregate? 
We leave this judgement as an exercise for the reader. 
APPENDIX II: TEXTUAL EVIDENCE FROM MARX 
Marx maintains his critique, which informs all his subsequent work 
The passage that opened this paper occurs in a very early work of Marx on economics. Whilst its 
formulations are neither casual nor inexact, it must be shown that later sharpening of the distinctions 
between exchange value, value, and price do not sublate, contradict or overturn this initial statement, 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  28 
but merely elaborate and give it further determinations. It must be shown that Marx did not abandon 
them, and that they did not become inconsequential to his later work. 
Indeed the same formulations occur repeatedly in his subsequent writings, and cannot be dismissed 
as an abandoned part of his early work, as the following show. 
Critique of Proudhon, of Darimon, and of the time-chitters 
Consider first his criticism of Proudhon in the Poverty of Philosophy (Marx 1978:61): 
It is not the sale of a given product at the price of its cost of production that constitutes the 
‘proportional relation’ of supply to demand, or the proportional quota of this product relatively to 
the sum total of production, it is the variations in supply and demand that show the producer what 
amount of a given commodity he must produce in order to receive in exchange at least the cost of 
production. And as these variations are continually occurring, there is also a continual movement 
of withdrawal and application of capital in the different branches of industry...if M. Proudhon 
admits that the value of products is determined by labour time, he should equally admit that it is 
the fluctuating movement alone that makes labour the measure of value.  
This criticism, to which I will return – and which, we should not forget, appears in a published work 
of Marx and hence in a form which he considered valid for public consumption, and certainly never 
repudiated – is not merely taken over into the Grundrisse (cited above in section 0000) in the critique 
of Darimon and the time-chitters but is specifically referenced there: 
Market value equates itself with real value by means of its constant oscillations, never by means 
of an equation with real value as if the latter were a third party, but rather by means of a constant 
non-equation of itself (as Hegel would say, not by way of abstract identity, but by constant 
negation of the negation, i.e. of itself as negation of real value). In my pamphlet against Proudhon 
I showed that real value itself – independently of its rule over the oscillations of the market price 
(seen apart from its role as the law of these oscillations) – in turn negates itself and constantly 
posits the real value of commodities in contradiction with its own character, that it constantly 
depreciates or appreciates the real value of already produced commodities… Price therefore is 
distinguished from value not only as the nominal from the real; not only by way of the 
denomination in gold and silver, but because the latter appears as the law of motions which the 
former runs through. But the two are constantly different and never balance out, or balance only 
coincidentally and exceptionally. The price of a commodity constantly stands above or below the 
value of the commodity, and the value of the commodity itself exists only in this up-and-down 
movement of commodity prices. Supply and demand constantly determine the prices of 
commodities; never balance, or only coincidentally; but the cost of production, for its part, 
determines the oscillations of supply and demand…On the assumption that the production costs of 
a commodity and the production costs of gold and silver remain constant, the rise or fall of its 
market price means nothing more than that a commodity, = x labour time, constantly commands > 
or < x labour time on the market, that it stands above or beneath its average value as determined 
by labour time.  
Value and equilibrium in Marx’s mature work 
The formulations concerning the non-equilibriation of supply and demand, recapitulating much of 
Marx’s polemic against Proudhon almost identically, is explicit in Volume I of Capital, which Marx 
himself prepared for publication: 
While within the workshop, the iron law of proportionality subjects definite numbers of workmen 
to definite functions, in the society outside the workshop, chance and caprice have full play in 
distributing the producers and their means of production among the various branches of industry. 
The different spheres of production, it is true, constantly tend to an equilibrium: for, on the one 
hand, while each producer of a commodity is bound to produce a use-value, to satisfy a particular 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  29 
social want, and while the extent of these wants differs quantitatively, still there exists an inner 
relation which settles their proportions into a regular system, and that system one of spontaneous 
growth; and, on the other hand, the law of the value of commodities ultimately determines how 
much of its disposable working-time society can expend on each particular class of commodities. 
But this constant tendency to equilibrium, of the various spheres of production, is exercised only 
in the shape of a reaction against the constant upsetting of this equilibrium. Chapter 14, my 
emphasis. 
A further interest of this passage is that it is one of the very few in which Marx employs the word 
‘equilibrium’ at all. At least in passing this raises the question: if he was an equilibrium theorist, why 
does the word appear so infrequently in his works, especially since when he chooses, he employs it 
with the meaning of modern economics? But second, he is at great pains to explain that the real 
motion consists not of an actually-established equilibrium but of a tendency towards it, which is 
‘exercised only in the shape of a reaction against its constant upsetting’; that is, it is only because the 
equilibrium does not occur, that the tendency manifests itself – which means, in turn, that the 
tendency to equilibrium manifests itself as a motion, not as an established fact. 
Price of production: a non-equilibrium concept 
Nor is this law a ‘Volume I concept’, a problem resolved with the full Volume III treatment of price 
of production. Marx does not raise the departure of price from values in Volume I, in order to 
dismiss the problem in Volume III by substituting static prices of production for static values. This 
popular conception is a travesty of all his actual writings on the subject. On the contrary, 
formulations virtually identical to his initial critique of Mill end up as the central core of the vital 
chapter IX of Capital which discusses how prices of production are formed (Marx 1981:291): 
The real inner laws of capitalist production clearly cannot be explained in terms of the interaction 
of demand and supply … since these laws are realized in their pure form only when demand and 
supply cease to operate, i.e. when they coincide. In actual fact, demand and supply never coincide, 
or, if they do so, it is only by chance and not to be taken into account for scientific purposes; it 
should be considered as not having happened. Why then does political economy assume that they 
do coincide? In order to treat the phenomena it deals with in their law-like form, the form that 
corresponds to their concept, i.e. to consider them independently of the appearance produced by 
the movement of demand and supply. And in addition, in order to discover the real tendency of 
their movement and to define it to a certain extent. For the disproportions are contrary in character 
and, since they constantly follow one another, they balance each other out in their movement in 
contrary directions, their contradiction. Thus if there is no single individual case in which demand 
and supply actually do coincide, their disproportions still work out in the following way – and the 
result of a divergence in one direction is to call forth a divergence in the opposite direction – that 
supply and demand always coincide if a greater or lesser period of time is taken as a whole; but 
they coincide only as the average of the movement that has taken place and through the constant 
movement of their contradiction. [my emphasis] 
This passage also introduces more centrally an idea which we noted in earlier passages referring to 
the ‘law of motions which value runs through’. It recurs systematically in Marx’s discussion of the 
law of value but is hardly ever, if at all, investigated by the several authors who seek to verify 
empirically the relation between values and prices. This is the idea that the empirical relation 
between value and price asserts itself over time.
 26 Supply and demand coincide over a ‘greater or 
lesser period of time’ but ‘only as the average of the movement’. 
This is in a certain sense obvious; anyone who can add up has to conceded that a continuous excess 
of supply over demand would result in a permanent accumulation of unsold goods, and it is not 
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disputed by Marx that such an accumulation would bring about a movement in prices leading to its 
reduction. However, it is a very different matter to assert that an average is formed through 
divergence, and to assert that this average is what actually happens. The average teenager is 5ft high 
but there are very relatively few 5ft teenagers, and they don’t tend to stay that size. The average 
position of a planet is in the middle of the sun, but this is not where we find any actual planet.  
The comparative static dogma, to which I shall return, consists in essence in the unsupported and 
false assertion that a system in movement behaves as if the averages of its motion actually occurred 
at every instant in time or, to put it another way, that the entire motion of the totality can be 
accounted for by treating it identical to its average. This is a surprisingly and indeed shockingly 
rudimentary mathematical error, and a salutory demonstration of the power which an ideological 
delusion can exert over the conduct of even the most brilliant and otherwise scientific people, when 
this delusion arises from material circumstance and connects with private interest. Of this, more later. 
Finally it is worth noting that Marx’s insistence on the non-coincidence of demand and supply is the 
foundation of his discussion of crisis and his devastating criticism of Say’s Law: 
Nothing can be more childish than the dogma, that because every sale is a purchase, and every 
purchase a sale, therefore the circulation of commodities necessarily implies an equilibrium of 
sales and purchases. If this means that the number of actual sales is equal to the number of 
purchases, it is mere tautology. But its real purport is to prove that every seller brings his buyer to 
market with him. Nothing of the kind… no one is forthwith bound to purchase, because he has 
just sold. Circulation bursts through all restrictions as to time, place, and individuals, imposed by 
direct barter, and this it effects by splitting up, into the antithesis of a sale and a purchase, the 
direct identity that in barter does exist between the alienation of one's own and the acquisition of 
some other man's product. To say that these two independent and antithetical acts have an intrinsic 
unity, are essentially one, is the same as to say that this intrinsic oneness expresses itself in an 
external antithesis. If the interval in time between the two complementary phases of the complete 
metamorphosis of a commodity become too great, if the split between the sale and the purchase 
become too pronounced, the intimate connexion between them, their oneness, asserts itself by 
producing – a crisis. [25] 
The imbalance between demand and supply is necessarily expressed, we again note, in time: if 
supply is unmatched by demand it means that someone has sold but has not purchased at the same 
time. 
Marx on necessary labour time 
1979:318 
APPENDIX III: MARX’S TRANSFORMATION PROCEDURE 
The academic presentation of Marx as a general equilibrium theorist begins with Sweezy (1970:53) 
who writes, in a formulation virtually unchallenged by Marxists since that time, that 
The law of value is essentially a theory of general equilibrium developed in the first instance with 
reference to simple commodity production 
The critics of Marx, most Marxists, and the post-Sraffians, have developed the dogmatic proposition 
that Marx’s value-concept is comparative static into the following two assertions, or their logical 
equivalents:
27 
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the value of any good is the price at which it would have to exchange in a hypothetical static 
economy with no profits, in order to equalise supply to demand in all sectors 
the price of production of any good is the price at which it would have to exchange in a hypothetical 
static economy with an equal profit rate, in order to equalise supply to demand in all sectors.  
There are many equivalent formulations. The clearest is the idea which Sweezy presents above: value 
is the price which obtains under a historically prior stage of capitalist development in which goods 
actually sell at their values free from the distracting influence of capital movements. Chris 
Arthur(1996) convincingly demonstrates that this originates with Engels and not Marx.
28 There is 
scant evidence in support of it in Marx’s own writings, and almost every phrase of Volume I 
contradicts it. Another common idea, which also appears to originate with Sweezy and is almost 
universal in Marxist pedagogy, is that the progression from Volume I to Volume III consists of a 
progression from value to price by means of ‘successive approximations’ or ‘successive levels of 
abstraction’ of which system (1) is the first stage. A third notion, originating with the post-Sraffians, 
is that Volume I presents a ‘pure labour’ economy with zero profits. 
Mathematically, all these ideas are the same and reduce to Sweezy’s honestly blunt, but false, 
statement. According to this dogma, the transformation problem consists in the fact that values 
defined by (1) cannot be transformed into prices as defined by (2) without violating one or other of 
Marx’s ‘equalities’. 
Where, and why, does Marx suppose price=value? 
Let us first assess assertion (1). 
The most elementary task confronting any reader who seeks to focus, even temporarily, on what 
Marx actually wrote, is to disabuse oneself of any notion that Marx presupposes, in Volume I, that 
goods exchange at values. In particular this presupposition does not appear at any point in the first 
five chapters of Volume I, in which the category of value is actually developed. There is no evidence 
for it; there is no suggestion in Marx that this was his intention; the idea is a pure fiction, which has 
grown over the course of the century into an almost unchallengeable article of faith. It receives 
support from the texts only if one reads them with the prior conviction that no other reading is 
possible. 
The simplifying assumption that value=price appears in Volume I at the end of Chapter 5, after all 
the substantive categories of value, price and money have been developed. Its function at this point, 
where it is perfectly explicit, is not to study value but to study surplus-value. Its use is fully justified 
by the lengthy discussion, in chapter 5, of the effect of all possible kinds of deviation between price 
and value, and a scientific demonstration that none of these variations can affect the magnitude of 
surplus value. It is not, therefore, in any sense a part of the definition of value and moreover, it is 
absolutely inessential to the development of the category of surplus-value itself. It is a simplification 
tout court; a completely expendable supposition made in order to make the exposition easier. 
Moreover the omission of value-price equality from the first five chapters is not an accident but is 
clearly part of a perfectly conscious decision. Whenever and wherever Marx supposes that values are 
equal to prices, he explicitly states it with great care, as he does with all his assumptions. In Volume 
I this assertion is found in the footnote at the end of chapter 5 ‘Contradictions in the general 
formula’, and restated and its position in the work makes it clear what its function is, namely, to 
examine a specific problem exhaustively treated in chapter 5: to identify the origin of surplus-value – 
not the nature of value itself. 
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Marx quite explicitly treats the deviation of price from value in completely general terms, in Chapter 
3 of Volume I, and it is at this point, not in Volume III, that the necessity of transformation from 
value into price is raised, as our citation in section 0 makes clear. 
The fact that price-value deviations are explicitly and coherently assessed cannot be dismissed as a 
fanciful abberation or slip of the pen. Volume I was the most worked-over and carefully considered 
of all Marx’s mature works. If Marx’s intention was that, throughout Volume I, there should be a 
ruling assumption that price=value, then it would have been inconceivable to leave such passages (let 
alone chapter 5 itself) in the place we find them. 
This is important in relation to the following fact, confusing to the reader who enters Volume I with 
the fixed preconception that it assumes price=value. Of course, at many points Marx offers 
illustrations – for example of the effect of changes in the magnitude of value – in which the argument 
supposes price=value. This is particularly so when he is considering the impact upon prices of a 
change in values, and necessarily so, since he needs in that case to distinguish clearly between the 
effects of supply and demand and the effects of changes in value as such. This is very different, 
however, from a ruling assumption that price=value, or that supply and demand must necessarily be 
equal. It constitutes no more than a partitioning of the impact of change into two parts, one being the 
change in value which is studied, the other being the impact of the market on prices, which can be 
temporarily set aside. 
Any non-equilibrium theorist, considering the general case of all possible market prices, is perfectly 
at liberty for the purposes of illustration to consider one particular set of market prices, namely 
exchange at values. Equilibrium is a special case of non-equilibrium, not vice versa. When a 
physicist studies the pendulum, s/he or he can and does consider the special case where it is not 
moving and even integrates this into the equations of motion of the pendulum. This is entirely 
different, however, from beginning with the assumption that the pendulum is at rest, and attempting 
to deduce its motion from this supposition. 
The decisive issue is the following for any such illustration: does it logically presuppose that 
price=value? In the case of Marx’s derivation of value as such it must also be asked whether the 
subsequent development of the value concept, when prices of production are introduced, contradicts 
or merely further determines the derivation.  
This is precisely why in Volume I Marx, very carefully, avoids introducing the surreptitious 
presupposition that price=value, when he is deriving the category of value. This is his decisive 
departure from Ricardo: it is why Samuelson’s ‘eraser’ accusation applies to the Ricardian 
presentation of Marx’s transformation (which does derive value by supposing price=value) but not to 
Marx’s own transformation (which does not derive value by supposing that price=value). 
Marx develops the conclusion that abstract labour is the substance of value not by considering the 
quantitative fact of the actual rates at which goods exchange, but the qualitative fact that they 
exchange at all. This is why the qualitative/quantititive distinction is so essential. No special 
quantitative assumption is involved, and that is why Marx feels completely free to depart from the 
special case in the earlier (p161) passage above. All the points to which I have previously drawn 
attention are recapitulated in this passage:  
Value is given independent of the relations between demand and supply, of the ‘circumstances which 
allow the price to be raised or compel it to be reduced’. This is because ‘the same amount of social 
labour-time must be expended on the reproduction of a quarter of wheat both before and after the 
change in price’; it receives this value in production, independent of circulation and the magnitude of 
this value ‘expresses a necessary relation to social labour-time which is inherent in the process by 
which its value is created.’ 
Price is itself the exponent of a magnitude of labour time. £2 represents ‘a quantity of socially 
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We again find that the price-value relation is asserted by laws, and that these laws assert themselves 
as averages over time, a point which Marx repeats and to which I shall return. 
In addition to all these points, we find the first definitive use of the word ‘transformation’. The 
notion that Marx’s transformation of values into prices is confined to Volume III does not itself come 
from Marx, whose sub-title for this volume was “The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole”. 
It comes from Volume I where the issue is clearly raised and, we will argue, in essence solved. The 
function of Volume III is not to present Marx’s transformation procedure like a rabbit from a hat, and 
then shut up shop and go home. It is to concretise a conception that already exists in abstract form in 
Volume I, given the extra determinations that follow from supposing fully-developed capitalism. 
Marx’s volume 1 transformation procedure 
Chapter V of Capital Volume I, entitled ‘Contradictions in the General Formula’  is devoted to 
assessing, systematically, whether value may be increased or decreased in circulation. Its purpose is 
to examine where surplus value comes from. It is thus a discussion of pure circulation: 
Let us take the process of circulation in a form in which it presents itself to us as the exchange of 
commodities pure and simple (1979:259) 
It ends with the famous ‘Hic Rhodus, hic Salta’ passage that begins: 
We have shown that surplus-value cannot arise from circulation, and therefore that, for it to be 
formed, something must take place in the background which is not visible in circulation 
itself…Capital cannot therefore arise from circulation, and it is equally impossible for it to arise 
apart from circulation. It must have its origin both in circulation and not in circulation. 
We therefore have a double result. 
The transformation of money into capital has to be developed on the basis of the immanent laws 
of the exchange of commodities, in such a way that the starting-point is the exchange of 
equivalents. The money-owner, who is as yet only a capitalist in larval form, must buy his 
commodities at their value, sell them at their value, and yet at the end of the process withdraw 
more value from circulation than he threw into it at the beginning. (1979:268-9) 
A footnote to this passage again clarifies the reasons for supposing exchange at values from this 
point on, quite unambiguously: 
The reader will see from the foregoing discussion that the meaning of this statement is only as 
follows: the formation of capital must be possible even though the price and the value of the 
commodity be the same, for it cannot be explained by referring to any divergence between price 
and value. If prices actually differ from values, we must first reduce the former to the latter, i.e. 
disregard this situation as an accidental one in order to observe the phenomenon of the formation 
of capital on the basis of the exchange of commodities in its purity, and to prevent our 
observations from being interfered with by disturbing incidental circumstances.(1979:269nn) 
The rest of this interesting footnote recapitulates the exact same points already made in our initial 
selection of citations. Here, we want to point out the following: 
as indicated, price=value is supposed at this point; that is, this was not the ruling supposition until 
now, or there would be no need to state it now 
the reason for making the supposition that price-value now is to study the formation of surplus-
value, given that the category of value has already been established without previously supposing 
price=value, that is, totally generally. 
Marx further clarifies the circumstances under which we may treat price-value deviations as 
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under discussion. We can ignore them because Marx considers that he has just proven that price-
value deviations, of any kind, cannot modify the size of surplus-value 
But this last point is simply Marx’s infamous ‘second equality’ in its abstract form, applied here 
not only to prices of production but to all market prices. Prices of production are not an addition 
to this basic idea but a concretisation of it; an application of this general thesis to the particular 
case where the profit rate tends to equalise. 
Moreove, the same statement necessarily implies Marx’s first equality. To see this, we must 
understand the two equalities as they appear in Volume III as a concretisation of the following, 
more general statements: 
the magnitude of value is an invariant of circulation 
the magnitude of surplus-value is an invariant of circulation 
The term ‘invariant’ here means that no possible re-arrangement of prices can bring about a 
variation in the total magnitude of value. To put this another way, the magnitude of value cannot 
be altered in circulation. This is a more general statement than that found in Volume III, which 
merely specifies the equality between two specific sets of prices, namely values and prices of 
production. The second equality is not really a ‘second equality’ at all; it appears so only to the 
mind of a Ricardian for whom the first equality is in any case a mysterious and arbitrary 
normalisation condition. As we have stated above, it simply asserts that extra value cannot arise in 
circulation. The ‘first’ and the ‘second’ equality or thus two ways of saying the same thing: one 
says the magnitude of value is constant and the other says no extra value can arise: in 
mathematical symbols the first says  
ΣP = constant in circulation 
the other says  
∆ΣP=0 in circulation 
This is like the difference between saying that all points at sea level are equidistant from the 
earth’s centre, and saying that one does not need to sail uphill. It is the same statement. The 
statement ‘sum of prices of production = sum of values’ is then like saying that Ellis island is the 
same distance from the earth’s centre as Alcatraz. 
In Volume III, Marx establishes the second equality in the shape of a formal deduction. This is 
necessary, because the category of surplus-value has now been fully developed and shown to 
originate in the sale and purchase of the commodity labour-power. The earlier Volume I 
transformation must therefore be further concretised, and it must be demonstrated that this 
concretisation does not overturn the original more abstract argument but sublates it, in normal 
dialectical fashion. 
But it follows that the Volume I transformation is, first of all, the abstract origin of the Volume III 
transformation and, second, it is not contradicted by the Volume III transformation. The equalities 
are already present abstractly in Volume I; they are not introduced out of the blue in Volume III 
but presented in a more concrete form, specifically restricted to fully-developed capitalism. 
The deduction of these equalities follows almost axiomatically from the concept of circulation 
itself. The very idea of circulation implies merely a change in the ownership of that which already 
exists. That is, it excludes production. Likewise, although perhaps less obviously, it excludes 
consumption. Therefore what happens in circulation is that a pre-existing totality of value is 
‘moved around’ or redistributed between economic agents, and this cannot be decreased or 
increased in the process. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First Marx does consider the exchange of equivalents. This he 
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can occur in circulation, by transferring a product from one person that has no use for it, to 
another who has). The careful formulation traces what is now hopefully familiar ground: 
The vulgar economists have practically no inkling of the nature of value; hence, whenever they 
wish to consider the phenomenon in its purity, after their fashion, they assume that supply and 
demand are equal, i.e. that they cease to have any effect at all. If, then, as regards the use-values 
exchanged, both buyer and seller may possibly gain something, this is not the case as regards 
exchange-value. (1979:261) 
Next, Marx enquires whether exchange of non-equivalents can increase value: 
If commodities, or commodities and money, of equal exchange-value, and consequently 
equivalents, are exchanged, it is plain that no one abstracts more value from circulation than he 
throws into it. The formation of surplus-value does not take place. In its pure form, the circulation 
necessitates the exchange of equivalents, but in reality processes do not take place in their pure 
form. Let us therefore assume an exchange of non-equivalents. (1979:262, my emphasis) 
In an exchange of equivalents, each draws out what she puts in, and neither the distribution or the 
sum of value can change. In an exchange of non-equivalents, however, it is possible for one 
individual or group of individuals to gain what another individual or group lose. This gives rise to 
the illusion that a surplus can arise from trade. But it is an illusion, because the sum of losses and 
gains must equal zero, given that the process has merely redistributed the same initial mass. 
Marx first considers a nominal increase in price: 
Suppose, then, that some inexplicable privilege allows the seller to sell his commodities above 
their value, to sell what is worth 100 for 110, therefore with a nominal price increase of 10 per 
cent. In that case the seller pockets a surplus-value of 10. But after he has sold he becomes a 
buyer. A third owner of commodities now comes to him as seller, and he too, for his part, enjoys 
the privilege of selling his commodities 10 per cent too dear. Our friend gained 10 as a seller only 
to lose it again as a buyer. In fact the net result is that all owners of commodities sell their goods 
to each other at 10 per cent above their value, which is exactly the same as if they sold them at 
their true value. 
Having established that a nominal price increase cannot augment value, Marx then considers changes 
in relative price: 
A may be clever enough to get the advantage of B and C without their being able to take their 
revenge. A sells wine worth £40 to B, and obtains from him in exchange corn to the value of £50. 
A has converted his £40 into £50, had made more money out of less, and has transformed his 
commodities into capital. Let us examine this a little more closely. Before the exchange we had 
£40 of wine in the hands of A, and £50 worth of corn in those of B, a total value of £90. After the 
exchange we still have the same total value of £90. The value in circulation has not increased by 
one iota; all that has changed is its distribution between A and B What appears on one side as a 
loss of value appears on the other side as surplus-value; what appears on one side as a minus 
appears on the other side as a plus. The same change would have taken place if A, without the 
disguise provided by the exchange, had directly stolen the £10 from B. The sum of values in 
circulation can clearly not be augmented by any change in their distribution…The capitalist class 
of a given country, taken as a whole, cannot defraud itself. 
However much we twist and turn, the final conclusion remains the same. If equivalents are 
exchanged, no surplus-value results, and if non-equivalents are exchanged, we still have no 
surplus value. Circulation, or the exchange of commodities, creates no value (Marx 1979:266, my 
emphasis) 
But this is exactly the ‘first and second equality’ in its fully general form. It asserts that the sum of 
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that is, cannot be augmented or diminished by a change in prices. It applies not just to prices of 
production, which are just one special case of the above, but to arbitrary market prices. 
This has not been concretised as a determination of any specific set of prices because at this point in 
Marx’s analysis, the labour-process as such has not been specified. Marx has not yet introduced the 
purchase and sale of the commodity labour-power, and has not even specified that production is 
capitalistic. This does not mean that production is in some sense ‘pre-capitalist’; it simply means that 
until now Marx has dealt with the most general features of commodity production, common to all 
modes of production in which the commodity appears. 
In consequence this transformation rule is completely general and applies to all market prices and all 
forms of commodity production. Far from failing to transform values into prices in volume I, Marx 
specifies the most general form of the transformation law, of which Volume III is but a specific 
concretisation which we will assess next. 
The use-value of money and the monetary equivalent of labour 
One last link is needed in order to assess Marx’s Volume III transformation procedure, namely the 
connection between money and capital. 
I earlier (section 0) referred to the simultaneous single-system approach of Moseley, Wolff-Callari-
Roberts, and others. This body of work made a seminal contribution, completely ignored by the 
surplus approach school, in defending Marx’s transformation procedure against the argument that 
Marx ‘forgot to transform inputs’ The insight that they brought to the transformation question, which 
originates with earlier input from the ‘New Solution’ authors, is that capital is represented for Marx 
not by the value of the goods which are purchased by the capitalists, but by the value of the money 
which pays for them. The ‘New Solution’ applies this to variable capital only whereas single-system 
authors (both simultaneous and temporal) apply it also to constant capital. 
Marx’s two equalities are then immediately respected and the supposed ‘error’ in his transformation 
procedure does not exist.
29 However, two problems remain for the simultaneous variants of this 
approach. First, they require something that Marx does not specify: that input prices should be equal 
to output prices. If this was Marx’s conception, why does he not furnish numerical examples in 
which it is the case? And to the extent that he does not, is von Bortkiewicz not justified at least to 
some extent in reproaching him with this fact, if it is a necessary assumption which Marx has 
overlooked? 
Second, the supposition that Marx equates capital with money spent must be tied in with an overall 
interpretation of Marx’s concept of money, or it takes on the appearance of yet another arbitrary 
numerical assumption to ‘make the numbers work’.  
Some very considerable work has been done on the second issue, the most outstanding in my view 
being Rodriguez(1996) But nevertheless it remains to connect up this special insight on 
transformation, with the more general and vibrant debate about money and Marx’s concept of 
money, that is in progress today. 
Establishing such a connection in all its ramifications is beyond my scope, but I do think it is 
necessary to show, in passing over to prices of production, that the single-system concept is not a 
particular feature of transformation but is a direct consequence of Marx’s concept of money itself. 
Not least, this is because Marx’s reproach against the Ricardians, with which we began, centres 
precisely on their neglect of the role of money in separating sale from purchase, and in mediating 
between independent private producers, leading to the necessary departure of price from value. 
                                                 
29 The reader is referred to the copious literature for verification under the interpretation of choice and for textual evidence – which can be found in 
abundance – in support of this assertion. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  37 
Where does Marx presuppose the equality of input and output prices? 
The simultaneous single-system approach presents a strange puzzle in the history of thought. None of 
the authors in this tradition have anything to lose by generalising their approach to a temporal 
concept. Yet in over five years of debate, only one author (Ramos) has done so. 
In the case of dualist authors, or even New Solution authors, I can understand that a major 
adjustment to past positions is needed to adopt TSS positions, and though this is something that 
every thinker must be prepared to do, it is genuinely intellectually difficult, not just because of the 
more venal fact that a record of publications and an academic status may be at stake, but because 
anyone who studies theory acquires a set of concepts and habits of thought which need to be re-cast 
as a whole when a new paradigm is adopted; this wholesale transition is difficult. This does not 
excuse a failure to rethink, since a paid intellectual is responsible not to her or himself but to the 
general public; it does help explain the phenomenon and is cause for sympathy. 
But very little that has been written by SSS authors needs to be reconsidered, in order to re-cast their 
work in a temporal framework. TSS values are a straight generalisation of SSS values. The SSS 
contribution is a milestone on the road to the TSS position, which I openly acknowledge and will 
continue to do so. What objections are there, from SSS authors, to the TSS generalisation? 
One possible argument, which I have heard only verbally, is that the SSS project only consisted in 
defending Marx’s transformation procedure and that there is therefore no need to go any further. Its 
field of enquiry is limited and therefore, so is its method. 
The principal objection which I have to this is that my aim is not just to defend Marx’s 
transformation; this is only the starting point in a much more general project of defending Marx’s 
entire value concept which, I think, is necessary simply because it is better than anything else around. 
It is a vastly superior concept to the whole of twentieth century economics, which operates as a kind 
of church of the market immaculate and, as a byproduct, as a kind of inquisitional machine for 
suppressing heretical alternatives, Marx’s own theory being top of the list. 
However even within the terms of the SSS protagonists, in the limited context of defending Marx’s 
transformation, a major objection to confining oneself to the simultaneous case is the following: any 
unprejudiced reader can refer to Marx’s own texts and see that Marx didn’t do it that way. His 
transformation tables do not presuppose the equality of input and output prices and, therefore, if this 
supposition is necessary, then Marx was indeed in error, and the procedure which SSS authors 
suggest is not Marx’s. This is a strange defence of Marx. 
The great brunt of the twentieth century attack on Marx consists in the repeated and false accusation 
that Marx ‘forgot to transform inputs’. It is not an adequate response to this accusation to say: ‘it is 
true that Marx forgot, but the failure is easily corrected.’ This is for two reasons: first, Marx did not 
forget to transform inputs, as we will now demonstrate, so that it is inconsistent, confusing and 
unnecessary to concede this point; but far more importantly, because the real function of these 
repeated accusations is not just to demand the transformation of inputs but to demand the equality of 
input and output prices. This is no less than a systematic (and successful) drive to foist the Ricardian 
method onto Marx: to make Marx into a ‘minor post-Ricardian’. For all the reasons already given, 
this is a travesty. We therefore take strong issue with any attempt to go beyond the defend Marx’s 
transformation procedure in a manner which actively assimilates Marx’s value concept to that of 
Ricardo or the classicals in general. 
One of the difficulties with much contemporary Marx interpretation is insufficient use of Occam’s 
razor. If Marx intended that input prices should equal output prices, he would have said so. The most 
reasonable and simplest assumption is much more straightforward: it is that he did not consider it 
made any substantive difference what the capitalists paid for their inputs: that is, he did not consider 
that this could modify his substantive conclusion, that total surplus value was equal to total profit. 
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Where does Marx say that inputs are purchased at their values? 
The only answer to the above question that makes sense is that he considered the transformation of 
inputs already to be implicit in the concept of capital. This in turn suggests that it is implicit in his 
conception of money.  
It is here that an important point intrudes. Whereas Marx is always explicit in stating, at definite 
points in his work, when goods are presumed to sell at their values, he is not likewise explicit in 
stating that they are purchased at their values. 
There is a difference. In Volume I Marx studies the ‘process of capitalist production, taken by itself, 
i.e. the immediate production process.’ (1981:118) Here, where Marx studies the circuit M-C-P…C'-
M' he does not presuppose anything special about how the inputs were produced. Indeed, he quite 
often refers to cases in which they are produced non-capitalistically, for example in ancient or 
Roman society. This is logically perfectly correct. He does not presuppose that capitalism exists as a 
self-sustaining mode of production but proves that it can do so in Volume II by demonstrating how 
the capitalist production process, studied in Volume I, is actually capable of creating the basis for its 
own existence by reproducing its own  initial conditions, allocating to private and un-coordinated 
producers the use- and exchange-values that they require to recommence production. 
The supposition that inputs are purchased at their values is therefore not introduced until Volume II 
(where it is very explicit) and is confined to that volume: that is, it does not a ruling assumption in 
Volume III. It is true that Marx’s illustrations of the procedure make this assumption – just as in the 
first part of Volume I, illustrations are to be found where goods are sold at their values, without 
making this into the ruling general assumption.  
Indeed, this is contradicted by the very words he uses: Volume III opens with the category of ‘cost-
price’ – not cost-value; that is, what it costs the capitalist in money to acquire her or his inputs. The 
ruling supposition is that the capitalist acquires inputs for money under general market conditions. 
The value of capital, in these circumstances, will be different depending on whether one considers 
the value of the commodities that make up these inputs, or the value represented by the money itself. 
The value of this money itself, then, is what we strongly believe Marx means when he speaks of the 
value of capital. 
We should not forget that it is supposed throughout his work, in fact from the very beginning of 
Volume I, that the capitalists acquire their inputs for money on the market. We should also not forget 
that Marx consistenly treats money as the representative of abstract social labour, and indeed insists 
on this point against Ricardo, as we have seen. We already seen this (section 0) in (Marx 1972:137)  
The whole matter turns on what meaning we should assign to the ‘value of capital’ since it is the 
capital, the money-form, with which the circuit begins. The dominant assumption is that the value of 
capital means the value of the goods that the money purchases. But the simplest and most coherent 
interpretation is to suppose that in purchasing their inputs for money, the capitalists have already 
given their capital the form of general social labour through the vehicle of money, and that the value 
of these inputs as such is irrelevant to the labour-process. From this point of view, if I spend £200 in 
money on some iron, and if this £200 itself represents 200 hours, then my capital is 200 hours 
whether the iron itself represents 100 hours or 300. If I pay over the odds for the iron, the value 
transfer that this represents is already accounted for in the act of purchase. It cannot again be 
accounted for in the act of consumption. I was robbed when I bought the iron, not when I used it. Or 
to be more precise, if its price sinks while it is in my possession, so that I am obliged by competition 
to sell my products cheaper when I use it, then I was robbed not by the act of using the iron, but by 
the fact that I let it stand still long enough for the market to take away its value, before I used it. 
Again, it is the preceding phase of circulation which transfers the value between the owners of 
inputs, not the labour-process which uses them. 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  39 
From this standpoint, Marx’s idea not only in Volume I but throughout Capital is that the value of 
capital is always, for the capitalist, given by the monetary representation of that capital. In that case, 
the analysis does not need to be altered if this monetary representation – the price of the goods 
making up the capital – changes in circulation. The value transferred to the product would then 
always be the market price of the consumed elements, and if this differs from the value of these 
elements, it would be the former rather than the latter which would determine the value transferred to 
the product. 
This also offers a much more reasonable and simpler explanation of those famous passages in which 
Marx acknowledges cost-price may diverge from value. The literature, perversely, interprets these as 
meaning that he knew he had a problem but chose not to deal with it. Again, Occam’s razor has been 
insufficiently applied in reading these texts. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, we 
have to assume that a writer means what he or she says. What does Marx actually say? 
[T]he cost price of a commodity, in which the price of production of other commodities is 
involed, can also stand above or below the portion of its total value that is formed by the value of 
the means of production going into it. It is necssary to bear in mind this modified significance of 
the cost price, and therefore to bear in mind too that if the cost price of a commodity is equated 
with the value of the means of production used up in producing it, it is always possible to go 
wrong. Our present investigation does not require us to go into further detail on this point. 
(1981:265) 
Why not suppose that when Marx ‘Our present investigation does not require us to go into it in 
further detail.’ he means ‘Our investigation does not require us to go into it in further detail’ rather 
than ‘oops, this is actually very difficult but I don’t have an answer right now’? 
The question then becomes: what interpretation makes sense of the view that the investigation 
does not require any more attention? And the obvious answer is: that the value of capital is in 
general given, for Marx, as the value represented by its monetary form, and it is therefore 
secondary or irrelevant whether the constituent elements of this money sum stand above or below 
their value. 
Textual support for this idea has been very substantially documented in the literature (see for 
example Freeman and Carchedi (1996)). The passage we cited in section (000) makes this explicit 
and we repeat the vital section: 
The present argument is just as valid if prices rise or fall not as a result of fluctuations in value, 
but rather as a result of the intervention of the credit system, competition, etc. 
Since the rate of profit is equal to the proportionate excess in the value of the product over the 
value of the total capital advanced, an increase in the rate of profit that arose from a devaluation 
of the capital advanced would involve a loss in capital value. (1981:208) 
This is completely explicit: both the value of consumed capital, and the denominator of the rate of 
profit, are given by the market price of its elements; that is, by the value represented by their money 
worth.  
This greatly clarifies Marx’s Volume I reference to the same phenomenon: 
The definition of constant capital given above by no means excludes the possibility of a change of 
value in its elements. Suppose that the price of cotton is one day sixpence a pound, and the next 
day, as a result of a failure of the cotton crop, a shilling a pound. Each pound of the cotton bought 
at sixpence, and worked up after the rise in value, transfers to the product a value of one shilling. 
(Marx 1979:319) 
It is true that in the same paragraph later on Marx explains that this change in price could be the 
consequence of a change in value, since a harvest failure means that more labour is required to 
produce the same amount of cotton. But he says this in order to make a specific point: that the 1999o (9-freeman-2).doc  40 
change in the value of the yarn originates outside of the valorisation process. Here, as in many other 
places, he uses price and value quite interchangeably to talk about the value of capital, and when he 
revisits the question in Volume III he is absolutely explicit that the change does not have to arise 
from a change in the value of the constituent elements of capital.  
Marx’s Volume III transformation 
What did Marx transform? ‘General’ versus Hypothetically Equal profit rates 
One of the most universal propositions of neoclassical and post-Sraffian dogma alike is the 
proposition that profit rates in all sectors of the economy are everywhere actually equal. This 
proposition plays a clear ideological role: in reproducing the prejudices of vulgar economics it 
permits neoclassical economics to speak of ‘the’ price of capital as being this uniform profit rate, 
treat capital into a ‘factor of production’  whose contribution to the price of the product is given by 
this price, and explain profit in Smith’s ‘adding up’ formula as the sum of the costs of the three 
factors of production – Marx’s ‘holy trinity’ of wages, capital, and land. 
This conception also traces its descent to Ricardo for whom profit was an actually equalised return 
on capital, and who expressed the contradiction between this and value by asserting that a 
commodity could not have ‘two prices’: two capitals could not have different returns. 
Marx did not share this dogma; in consequence he nowhere asserts that profit rates actually equalise 
and quite the contrary, is at great pains to refer to it as the ‘average’ or ‘general’ profit rate and as an 
ideal that exists only in the heads of the capitalists.
30 
Between the spheres more or less approximating the average there is again a tendency towards 
equalisation, seeking the ideal average, i.e. an average that does not really exist. (Marx 1981:173, 
my emphasis) 
This distinction is indispensable for at least three of his objectives, without which his dynamic 
analysis is wrecked beyond repair. 
he has to explain the motion of capital; that is, he has to explain what causes capital to migrate from 
one sector and process of production to another sector and process of production. This motion ceases 
to exist if profits actually equalise; there is no reason for capital to move. The actual motor force of 
capitalist development is the pursuit of superprofit or surplus profit; a profit above the average 
resulting from either a monopoly advantage or an advance in productivity. 
he has to explain rent and consequently the price of the produce of the land; this requires that the 
profit on both agricultural and mineral production where differential rent is obtained is higher than 
the average. Nor is this a minor matter, since agricultural goods are always the point of departure for 
means of consumption, and minerals the point of departure for means of production. Virtually 
everything in capitalists society contains an integrated input from a sector where the rate of profit is 
not equal to the average. 
he has to explain the rate of interest and profits on banking capital, which as a portion of general 
profit is always necessarily less than the general rate of profit. Money capital does not, and cannot 
for any significant length of time, attrach the average profit rate or industrial production would cease 
Why, then, does he require the category at all? Because as a mental category, which enters the 
consciousness of the capitalists (but does not govern actual exchange) it determines, first of all the 
return on commercial capital, second the upper limit of the return on money capital, and thirdly the 
bottom limit of the return on land. 
                                                 
30 It is precisely because prices of production are ideal, that no claim is made that they function as actual prices. For Marx this is not a problem and 
indeed he systematically polemicises against the idea, because of his clear distinction between market price and price of production, and because of his 
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From this it follows that there is no requirement in Marx for prices actually to attain prices of 
production and it would make nonsense of his Volume III project to suppose that they do. 
It is nevertheless reasonably clear that Marx conceived of prices of production as a regulator of 
market prices, in the precise sense of an average over time of actual market prices: to be precise, 
over the period of the cycle: 
APPENDIX IV: ON STATIONARITY 
(incomplete: removed) 
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